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ABSTRACT

Privacy literature contains conceptualizations of privacy in relation to
role-playing and identity construction, and in relation to access control and
boundary-management. In this paper, I combine both strands to introduce the
concept ofprivacy spaces: spaces in which you can play, in your own way, the
relevant role(s) you have in social life. Drawing from privacy conceptions in
legal scholarship, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, human geography, and
psychology, a systematic overview of traditional privacy spaces is offered, including mental bubbles, the body, personal space, personal writings, the home,
private conversation space, cars, stalls, intimacy bubbles, professional black
boxes, coffee house spaces, public places, and political privacy places.
This overview yields important insights: privacy is an infrastructural
condition relevant in all zones of social life (from personal to public); privacy
boundaries can be visible or invisible, fluid or stable, impenetrable or permeable;
privacy protection relies on complementary mechanisms of access restriction and
discretion (a distinction that captures privacy protection more accurately than
that between access and control); and, most importantly, privacy protection is
primarily a process of social regulation rather than legal regulation.
These insights are used to briefly discuss why digital, online, and onlife
spaces pose privacy challenges. While traditional spaces of social interactions
are being scrambled and rehashed into digital and onlfe spaces, associated social
norms do not necessarily co-evolve. Because digital spaces are often
interconnected and interoperable, fewer boundaries avail to clearly delimit
privacy boundaries, and digital spaces more often trigger different partial

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss2/8

2

Koops: Privacy Spaces

2018]

PRIVACYSPACES

613

identities than traditional spaces do. Moreover, the co-habitation of service
providers in digital spaces contrasts with traditional physical spaces, where
"space providers" do not usually or systematically observe what people do. Thus,
digital, or onlife, impression management virtually requires people to be aware
of all their selves all of the time, severely hampering their feeling they can safely
be "themselves" in any given situation, and leading to a demise of backstage
spaces where people can relax from impression management.
Keywords
privacy, identity, space, place, impression management, boundary
management, social norms, discretion, digital privacy, onlife
1.

INTRODUCTION

One of the reasons why Nineteen Eighty-Fourremains a powerful novel
is that Winston Smith, against the odds, is a round, complex character-in
contrast to the flat characters pervading the novel who have been disciplined into
submission by ubiquitous surveillance. He is a complex character because he
retains some space in which he can enjoy a form of privacy, and therewith remain
true to himself:
[b]y sitting in the alcove, and keeping well back, Winston was
able to remain outside the range of the telescreen, so far as sight
went. He could be heard, of course, but so long as he stayed in
his present position he could not be seen. It was partly the
unusual geography of the room that had suggested to him the
thing that he was now about to do.... The thing that he was
about to do was to open a diary.'
Thus, Winston actually has two privacy spaces. Not only is the alcove a
place into which he can withdraw, the diary is also a space in which Winston can
immerse himself, putting his thoughts in order and making some sense of himself
and his surroundings. Both spaces are invaded in the end, but for as long as they
last, they allow Winston to remain and further develop himself in a hostile
world.2
A space in which you can be yourselves-that is, in which you can play,
in your own way, the relevant role(s) you have in social life'-is what I call a
"privacy space." The relationship between privacy, role-playing, and identity

GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FouR 10--11 (Penguin Books 1984) (1949).
Ultimately, also Winston's third and most personal privacy space-his mind-will be
invaded; see infra Section HI.A.1.i.
2

Cf ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) [hereinafter

THE PRESENTATION OF SELF] (analyzing how people conduct impression management when
performing different roles in social interactions).
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construction is an important theme in privacy literature,4 and while there are, of
course, numerous other conceptualizations of privacy, having a space in which
you can be yourselvess is a convenient way to describe what privacy entails in
its many manifestations.6
Privacy spaces are part of the private sphere. Here, the two meanings of
the term "private" (hidden, inaccessible, or secluded on the one hand and own or
personal on the other) are connected: "the person is allowed to refuse outsiders
access to a certain sphere because that sphere is personal."' The most obvious
such space is the home, as geographer Tim Creswell, writing on space and place,
has observed: "Home is where you can be yourself."' But home is not the only
space where people can be themselves; rather, any space in which one feels "in
place" can be like home,' and thus can be a privacy space.
The variety of privacy spaces is visible in Alan Westin's four "basic
states" of individual privacy,10 all of which can occur in different spatial settings.
4
See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY
OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 129-30 (2012) (discussing the importance of the performance of identity
in the evolving subjectivity that underlies privacy interests); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 13 (1967) (discussing how "individuals have conflicting roles to play in any society; to

play these different roles with different persons, the individual must present a different 'self' at
various times. Restricting information about himself and his emotions is a crucial way of protecting
the individual in the stresses and strains of this social interaction") (citation omitted); Ferdinand
Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in PHILosoPHIcAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 410 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed. 1984) (arguing that privacy "may provide the
contexts in which various facets of personality can develop"). Cf Philip E. Agre, Introduction, in
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 7 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997)
(defining the right to privacy as "the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of
one's own identity").
5
I use "yourselves" rather than "yourself" here to indicate that people do not have a "core"
self or a single, static, or "true" identity; "being yourselves" is used in this paper as shorthand for
feeling free to perform, without unreasonable constraints, one or more roles that are relevant in a
particular context at a particular moment in time. Cf Russell W. Belk, Extended Self in a Digital
World, 40 J. CONSUMER RES. 477, 483 (2013) [hereinafter Extended Self] ("there is no singular
core self"); Schoeman, supra note 4, at 410 (discussing and defending the view "that there is no
core self").
6
I elaborate the conceptualization of privacy as "having a space in which you can be
yourselves" in a work-in-progress paper, provisionally entitled Privacyas Identity Space, where I
attempt to show how such a conceptualization is able to connect many, seemingly disparate, strands
in privacy theory.
7

PETER BLOK, HET RECHT OP PRIVACY. EEN ONDERZOEK NAAR DE BETEKENIS VAN HET BEGRIP

280 (2002) (translated, emphasis in
original).
8
TIM CRESSWELL, PLACE: AN INTRODUCTION 39 (2d ed. 2015).
9
Id. at 38-39 (observing that, in terms of a place where people can be themselves, "home
acts as a kind of metaphor for place in general").
10
WESTIN, supra note 4, at 31-32 (discussing (1) solitude (where someone is alone and free
from observation of others), (2) intimacy (where someone is part of a small unit involving a "close,
relaxed, and frank relationship"), (3) anonymity (where someone is in public places or performs a
'PRIVACY' IN HET NEDERLANDSE EN AMERIKAANSE RECHT
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Solitude and intimacy will often be achieved in private places, typically in
closed-off spaces (a bedroom, a bathroom, a private office). Nevertheless, they
can also (particularly in crowded social contexts) be sought in public places, such
as a park or a beach." Anonymity and reserve are states of privacy that will
usually occur in public or publicly accessible places, because these states are
relevant when someone finds himself in the presence of others yet seeks to
reserve a space for himself free from the curiosity or surveillance of others.
Anonymity is achieved when someone "is able to merge into the 'situational
landscape"' and thus can enjoy "the sense of relaxation and freedom that men
seek in open spaces and public arenas" without being under (systematic)
observation. 2 Reserve is also spatial in that it involves "mental distance" to
protect the personality." Mental distance serves as a complement to physical
distance to acquire the desired level of distance from others, in order to delineate
and defend a space around oneself that is shielded from too much or undesired
curiosity and surveillance.
To what extent states of privacy are associated with particular spaces or
places is culturally dependent; Westin claims, for instance, that "[t]he English
accomplish with reserve what Germans require doors, walls, and trespass rules
to enforce."' 4 Yet all societies, to a greater or lesser extent, apply "distancesetting mechanisms to define territorial spacing of individuals in the group."
Although the spatial setting of privacy has been recognized in privacy
literature, and extensive discussions are available of particular privacy spaces, a
systematic overview of privacy spaces is lacking. In this paper, I offer such a
systematic overview for two reasons. First, it enables a relatively comprehensive,
bird's-eye overview of the many settings in which privacy matters-settings that
have developed over considerable periods of time with their own practices,
norms, expectations, and mechanisms to protect privacy. Analyzing how privacy
functions, or has functioned, in these traditional spatial settings can teach us
something important about privacy protection, such as its reliance in many
situations on social norms and others' discretion. Second, it sheds new light on
public act but "seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and surveillance"), and (4) reserve
(where someone has created "a psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion; this occurs when
the individual's need to limit communication about himself is protected by the willing discretion
of those surrounding him")).
"
See id. at 15 (discussing that in cultures "where the household is crowded, or when there are
communal households of large numbers of families sharing the dwelling, the sexual act is usually
performed outside, so that privacy can be obtained, in bush, field, forest, or beach"); see also Stuart
Shapiro, Places and Spaces: The HistoricalInteractionof Technology, Home, and Privacy, 14
INFo. Soc'Y 275, 278 (1998) (observing that if"one could not obtain the desired measure ofprivacy
in the home, one might it in the fields or the woods or the barn").
12
WESTIN, supra note 4, at 31.
13
Id at 32.
14
'5

Id. at 29.
Id. at 9.
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the challenge of digital or online privacy. Focusing on the spatial setting of
privacy helps to remind us that privacy is a condition of human beings and that
humans are embodied beings, living in four-dimensional space/time.' 6 The rise
of digitized, networked interactions and the increasing emphasis in the privacy
debate on personal data often seem to suggest that only bits and bytes matter; but
cyberspace cannot exist without meatspace," and we have quickly outlived the
period in which cyberspace and meatspace, the "virtual" and the "real," could be
seen as separate realms. "Bits don't just sit out there in cyberspace, to be visited
occasionally like pictures in a gallery .. .. It makes more sense to recognize that

invisible, intangible, electromagnetically encoded information establishes new
types of relationships among physical events occurring in physical places.""
Through focusing not on personal data but on the spaces where personal data are
processed, and highlighting how these relate to traditional privacy spaces, the
complexities of online privacy can be better understood.
My aim in this Paper is therefore to present the broad array of spaces in
which privacy can be enjoyed and to enhance our understanding of the challenges
of digital and online privacy. The emphasis will be on the first, because this part
needs to be developed in depth to lay the groundwork for the second (which is to
be elaborated in future research). This gives the Paper something of a twentiethcentury feel-I want particularly to sketch the privacy spaces as they have

16
COHEN, supra note 4, at 132 (observing that "processes of self-construction are
geographically mediated"), 216 (arguing that people live in a networked society where information
and digital flows are increasingly important, yet people remain embodied and part of physical
space, which implies that the room people need for boundary management involves physical
(bodily and territorial) spaces as well as digital spaces, and hybrids thereof); EDWARD T. HALL,
THE HIDDEN DIMENSION 186 (Anchor Books 1990) (1966) (emphasizing that "man and his
environment ... [are] part and parcel of one interacting system") (citation and italics omitted);
Margot E. Kaminski, RegulatingReal- World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REv. 1113, 1130 (claiming
that "[i]dentifying what was valuable in past privacy intuitions is particularly important as
boundaries between home and not-home, and the physical and online world, become fuzzier and
more fluid in light of technological and social change"); Robert Sommer, PersonalSpace in a
DigitalAge, in HANDBOOKOF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 647, 654 (Robert B. Bechtel & Arza
Churchman eds., 2002) (emphasizing that "at some point, this virtual world intersects with the real
world").
7
"Meatspace" refers to the "physical world, as opposed to cyberspace or a virtual
environment."
Meatspace,
OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/meatspace (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). The term can
be traced back to William Gibson, who coined the term cyberspace and contrasted this with the
"meat" environment of bodies in physical space. See WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 77 (Ace
Books 1984) (observing, for instance, that "[t]ravel is a meat thing").
18
WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, ME++: THE CYBORG SELF AND THE NETWORKED CITY 4 (2003)
(emphasis in original); see also Shapiro, supra note 11, at 276 (using the home, and more broadly
a spatial framework, to discuss the interaction of technology and privacy, and arguing that while
"no single analytical approach can hope to encompass the range of privacy issues posed by new
information and communication technologies, the boundary work performed by the home is a
widely useful vantage point").
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developed in the physical world, because online spaces can only be understood
in relation to social interactions rooted in the physical world. Part of my
argument rests on the claim that online spaces are not intrinsically new and sui
generis spaces but rather combinations, adaptations, and extensions of existing
spaces.' The kernel of the paper therefore consists in an extensive discussion of
traditional, "real-world" spaces.
The Paper is based on desk research, drawing from privacy conceptions
in legal scholarship and philosophy, but also from sociology, anthropology,
human geography, and psychology. Most examples in these bodies of literature
stem from Western societies, implying that the overview has a Western focus.
Nevertheless, I hypothesize that the overview is fairly comprehensive, possibly
even for non-Western societies-my intention is to sketch something like the
smallest common multiple of privacy spaces, that is, the most succinct set of
privacy spaces that includes all major privacy spaces prevalent in some or more
(Western) societies. 20 These are types of spaces, which may have quite divergent
manifestations in different cultures (such as different dwelling constructions) but
share a general characteristic in social life (such as home). Not all spaces
discussed here will function as privacy spaces in all (Western) societies; but if a
type of space functions as an important privacy space somewhere, it should be
included in the overview. Whether the hypothesis of relative comprehensiveness
holds up is to be tested in future research.
Besides the Western focus, another limitation needs to be emphasized
here. This paper is descriptive, not normative. That is to say, I describe types of
places that, in some or many societies, tend to function as important spaces where
people (in general) may be able to be themselves. Some types of spaces will
foster privacy more for certain (privileged) groups than for other (marginalized)
groups, and some people will feel highly restrained in their behavior in settings
where others feel free to be themselves. Although unequal access to spaces and
individual differences give rise to important normative questions, I do not discuss
whether or to what extent certain spaces should function as privacy spaces, in
general or in relation to particular groups. My concern in this Paper is conceptual
rather than legal or ethical: I want to map spaces that typically function as privacy

19
In slightly different terms, this claim has been defended by Helen Nissenbaum. HELEN
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE

223 (2010) (where she "reject[s] the idea that social networking sites define a newly emergent, sui
generissocialcontext with its own internal rules and, accordingly,... that there are no entrenched
norms with which we need to contend. What seems to make more sense is a conception of these
sites as a medium of interaction, transaction, information exchange, communication, and much
more, serving and extending the transactionalrange of a diverse variety of social contexts")
(emphasis added); see also text accompanying supra note 18.
20
In mathematics, the smallest common multiple (not to be confused with the largest common
denominator) of a set of integers is the smallest integer that is divisible by each of them. See Least
Common Multiple, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Least-common-multiple (last visited
Nov. 1, 2018).
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spaces, which can serve as groundwork for further normative analyses of how
the right to privacy applies or should apply in particular spaces.
The Paper is structured as follows. In Part II, I start by discussing the
notion of "space" and explaining the importance of approaching privacy through
a spatial lens. Subsequently, in Part III, I discuss a wide array of spaces in which
it can be important to be able to be yourselves, including mind, body, personal
writings, home, private conversation space, car, various places in the semiprivate zone, publicly accessible places, and public places. Finally, in Part IV, I
go into the problem of digital privacy spaces. The challenges of digital privacy
are partly related to the fact that digital space comprises (and collapses) different
types of personal, intimate, semi-private, and public spaces, which are less
visibly separated than their equivalent traditional physical spaces. I discuss how
framing the problem of digital privacy in spatial terms helps to better understand
digital privacy's challenges, which is a precondition for addressing them. I end
with drawing conclusions from this analysis and offering a brief outlook on
future research.
II. SPACE AND THE SPATIAL CONTEXT OF PRIVACY

In this Part, I will first discuss the concept of space in general, and
subsequently its significance in privacy theory in particular.
A.

The Concept of Space

The concept of space has been extensively discussed and conceptualized
in different ways in geography and related fields.2 1In this paper, I use "space" in
the classic sense of "a backdrop against which human behaviour is played out." 22
This consists of a location (coordinates on the Earth's surface) and a locale, that
is, "the material setting for social relations." 23 When the space is made
meaningful, by and for people, it becomes a place.2 4 The terms "space" and
"place" are therefore used in this paper literally rather than metaphorically, and
distinct from the more abstract concept of "context." It should be noted that
spatial backdrops are not pre-existing neutral containers but are socially
produced, implying that spaces are perceived, conceived, and lived by people in

21

See generally KEY THINKERS ON SPACE AND PLACE (Phil Hubbard & Rob Kitchin eds., 2d

ed. 2011); Bert-Jaap Koops & Maga Gali, Conceptualizing Space and Place: Lessons from
Geographyfor the Debate on Privacy in Public, in PRIVACY IN PUBLIC SPACE: CONCEPTUAL AND
REGULATORY CHALLENGES 19 (Tjerk Timan et al. eds., 2017) (providing an overview of concepts

and theories of space and place in human geography for legal, governance, and other scholars).
22

Phil Hubbard & Rob Kitchin, Introduction: Why Key Thinkers?, in KEY THINKERS ON SPACE

AND PLACE 1, 4 (Phil Hubbard & Rob Kitchin eds., 2d ed. 2011).
23

CRESSWELL, supra note 8, at 13.

24

Id. at 12 (defining "place" as "a meaningful location").
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a process of co-production. While all spaces are physical in the sense of having
a location somewhere on Earth, some spaces can have a locale that lacks fixed,
material boundaries: spaces can also be delimited by fluid, immaterial
boundaries. For instance, personal space is delimited by an invisible bubble
surrounding a person, which fluctuates depending on the circumstances.2 6
Nevertheless, all spaces discussed in this paper have a "real-world" location and
an environmental setting.
B. The Importance ofSpace in Privacy Theory
Spaces where privacy can be found have always been important. As
Vincent observes, "[t]here are no beginnings" in the history of privacy, because
"there was surely never a time when individuals, families or groups did not
sometimes claim the right to withdraw from public scrutiny into a space of their
own."27 It is therefore unsurprising that spatial conceptions of privacy form a key
strand in privacy theory. Indeed, as Julie Cohen has observed, although spatial
metaphors for privacy are often rejected as ill-suited for the networked
information age, "spatial metaphors continually recur in privacy discourse,"2 8
and this "insistent recurrence . .. suggests that something about the experience
of privacy, and that of privacy invasion, is fundamentally and irreducibly
spatial." Many scholars"o build on Irwin Altman's account of privacy as
boundary management," which in turn partly built on Edward Hall's theory of
four distances that people (and other animals) maintain from each other: intimate,
personal, social, and public distance. Although not always phrased in explicitly

See generally HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE (Donald Nicholson-Smith
trans., 1991) (describing how space is constructed).
26
See infra Section III.A.2.ii.
27
DAVID VINCENT, PRIVACY: A SHORT HISTORY 2 (2016) (quoting DIANA WEBB, PRIVACY AND
25

SOLITUDE IN THE MIDDLE AGES ix (2007)).
28
COHEN, supra note 4, at 109.
29

Id. at 139.

30

See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 10-11

(Vintage Books 1989) (1983) (defining privacy as "the condition ofbeing protected from unwanted
access by others--either physical access, personal information, or attention"); COHEN, supra note
4, at 131 (building on Altman's "model of privacy as a dialectical process of boundary regulation
by embodied subjects"); Kaminski, supra note 16, at 1113 (using Altman's framework as a
jumping-off point to conceptualize privacy harm in relation to physical-space surveillance); Anne
Uteck, Ubiquitous Computing and Spatial Privacy, in LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL:
ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 83, 92-96 (Ian Kerr et al. eds.,

2009) (discussing privacy and space).
31

IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE,

TERRITORY, CROWDING 18 (1975) (defining privacy as "selective control of access to the self or to
one's group") (emphasis omitted).
32
HALL, supranote 16, at 113-29.
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spatial terms, the prevalent conceptualization of privacy as some form of
inaccessibility or restricted accessibility33 is essentially spatial in character, as it
presumes a boundary that precludes access. Thus, people manage the boundaries
of the spaces surrounding them in order to modulate the interaction with other
people, a process that fluctuates over time and depends on the types of
relationships people maintain.
People enact many different roles in social life, and privacy spaces
encompass-in Erving Goffman's terms-both frontstage and backstage
settings: people actively manage the impressions they give off on-stage (being
aware how their audience will perceive them), but they relax off-stage, leaving
behind the different roles they play in their various on-stage social interactions. 34
Also, Westin has emphasized the role of privacy in playing social roles,35 and,
following Goffman's metaphor, the necessity of relief from always having to be
on-stage:
There have to be moments "off stage" when the individual can
be "himself": tender, angry, irritable, lustful, or dream-filled.
Such moments may come in solitude; in the intimacy of family,
peers, or woman-to-woman and man-to-man relaxation; in the
anonymity of park or street; or in a state of reserve while in a
group. Privacy in this aspect gives individuals, from factory
workers to Presidents, a chance to lay their masks aside for
36

rest.

This quotation shows how privacy is spatially situated. The access
control and boundary management of spaces-which embody privacy as a
negative freedom (freedom from)3 7 -iS vital for fostering the positive freedom

3
See, e.g., BLOK, supra note 7, at 278 (conceptualizing privacy as "the inaccessibility of the
personal sphere of life"); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423
(1980) (conceptualizing privacy "as a concern for limited accessibility").
34
GOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 112-34 (discussing "backstage" as "a place, relative to a given
performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a
matter of course." Thus, it is a place where "the performer can relax; he can drop his front, forgo
speaking his lines, and step out of character."). Cf Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 196, 200 (1890) (arguing that "solitude and privacy have
become more essential to the individual" because the "intensity and complexity of life, attendant
upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world" and connecting
this retreat from the world with peace of mind).
3

See WESTIN supra note 4.

36

Id. at 35.

3
The negative aspect of privacy is visible in its etymology: privatus (withdrawn from public
life) stems from privare,meaning to bereave and deprive. See BOK, supra note 30, at 287-88.
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(freedom to) that privacy also entails, 38 to foster autonomy, self-development,
and identity construction." Modulating the social interactions taking place
within certain spaces gives people room for autonomy and self-development.
The link between access control and self-development is already visible in the
emergence and rise of privacy in the nineteenth century. As Peter Gay observed
in his study of Victorian bourgeois culture, "[p]rivate space meant space for
genuine choices," and "the rising possibilities for privacy ... were intimately
linked to a widespread fascination with the self."40 Similarly, Adam Moore has
argued that privacy, as controlling access to ourselves, "affords individuals the
space to develop as they see fit."41
This illuminates the infrastructural character of privacy: having privacy
spaces is an important presupposition for autonomy, self-development, and the
other values that privacy contributes to. Thus, privacy spaces create opportunities
that people may or may not want to take.42 And it is because privacy can serve
many other values that it is also a value in itself: its infrastructural character
makes privacy so precious to preserve, as a vital condition of human life as a
social animal. In that sense, "[pirivacy is like oxygen. We really appreciate it
only when it is gone."4 3
In the next part, I will elaborate the connection between privacy and
spaces by building on these earlier accounts in privacy theory and I will enrich

See Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology ofPrivacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 483, 556-58 (2017)
(showing that privacy includes types on both the negative and the positive side of the spectrum of
freedom).
3
See Ciartn Mc Mahon & Mary Aiken, Privacy as Identity Territoriality: ReConceptualisingBehaviour in Cyberspace 14-15 (Working Paper No. 14.1, February 4, 2014),
https://ssrn.com/abstract-2390934 (conceptualizing privacy as "territoriality of identity" and
emphasizing that the self is fundamentally a locative system); see also Bart Eeckhout, Why Would
the Spatial Be So Special? A Critical Analysis of the Spatial Turn in American Studies, in
AMBASSADORS: AMERICAN STUDIES IN A CHANGING WORLD 19, 23 (Massimo Bacigalupo

&

38

Gregory Dowling eds., 2006) (observing that because identities are "seen as socially constructed,
the environments in which they are constructed must be closely monitored and extensively
analyzed down to the smallest detail"); cf WESTIN, supra note 4, at 33 (discussing autonomy in
the context of an "individual's relations with others in terms of a series of 'zones' or 'regions' of
privacy leading to a 'core self"), 36 (observing that "[e]very individual needs to integrate his
experiences in a meaningful pattern and to exert his individuality on events").
40

PETER GAY, SCHNITZLER'S CENTURY 276-77 (2002).

41
Adam D. Moore, Toward InformationalPrivacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 809, 81213 (2007); see also COHEN, supra note 4, 109 (arguing that "[plrivacy concerns the boundary
conditions between self and society and the ways that those conditions mediate processes of self-

formation"); WOLFGANG SOFSKY, PRIVACY: A MANIFESTO 30 (Steven Rendall trans., Princeton

University Press 2008) (2007) (observing that "[p]rivacy is the citadel of personal freedom.... It
keeps unauthorized persons out. The fortress ensures independence and self-determination").
42
Cf SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 34 (observing that "[n]o one is obliged to actually exercise
the freedom offered by the private sphere").
43
CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 4 (1999).
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them with insights from other streams of literature to show the broad spectrum
and variety of privacy-relevant spaces.
III. AN ARRAY OF PRIVACY SPACES
What are the typical spaces where privacy can be enjoyed? Although the
first thing that springs to mind might be the "room of one's own," some people
may think rather of the shower, the public library's reading room, or the pub
around the corner. There is a vast array of possible spaces in which people can
feel comfortable enough to be who they want to be at that moment-and much
will depend, of course, on the context (e.g., how many and which other people
are present, what the relationship is with them, which mood you are in, etc.).
To make some sense of the vast number of privacy spaces, in this section
I present types of spaces that I consider important, perhaps prototypical, for
achieving a condition of privacy. The overview is based on the spaces I found
discussed in key sociological and human-geography literature on privacyrelevant spaces, complemented with insights from other privacy-related
literature, as well as from a typology of objects of the right to privacy.'
Privacy spaces might roughly be conceived of as a series of concentric
circles," from the smallest and most isolated space to ever larger and more social
spaces. Thus, "the individual can be seen to be situated at the core of a multilayered shell, surrounded by an onion-shaped structure of layers of protection."46
To provide some structure, I have classified the privacy spaces according
to the four zones of social interactions that can be distinguished in privacy
literature: the personal, the intimate, the semi-private, and the public zone.4 7 This
classification serves to help the reader navigate from the most secluded to the
most social types of places, but it should be borne in mind that some places (such
as mental bubbles or cars) do not fit neatly within a particular zone of social
interaction; I have classified these pragmatically under the zone where they seem
to fit best from the perspective of onion-shaped layers of protection.

Koops et al., supra note 38, at 540-42.
45
See WESTIN, supra note 4, at 33 (conceiving of a "core self. . . as an inner circle surrounded
by a series of larger concentric circles").
4

4

Au MADANIPOUR, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPACES OF THE CITY 25 (2003); see also ERVING

GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 29-41 (1971) [hereinafter

RELATIONS IN PUBLIC] (discussing different "territories of the self' as "preserves"); HALL, supra
note 16, at 115 (seeing "man as surrounded by a series of expanding and contracting fields which
provide information of many kinds"); PLACE ATTACHMENT xi (Irwin Altman & Setha M. Low eds.,
1992) (discussing place attachment in relation to "a variety of environments: small-scale objects,
moderate-scale environments such as homes, larger-scale communities and neighborhoods, and
very large-scale cities and regions").
47
Koops et al., supra note 38, at 545-54.
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A. PersonalZone
The personal zone is characterized by isolation: situations in which a
person is on her own, with no interaction with others. Spaces in this zone involve
"all those multiple aspects of private life that, by their nature, allow a total
isolation .. . or, in any case, do not suppose any relation with other persons." 48
1.

Mind

The mind's personal zone consists of three main types of personal
spaces: thoughts, mental bubbles, and personal writings and other expressions of
the mind.
i.

ThoughtsO

In a world of ubiquitous surveillance, the mind is the last bastion of
privacy. George Orwell's Winston, while ostensibly conforming with what he is
supposed to do and enacting the kind of person he is supposed to be, can still
think what he wants and be a different person in his own mind; this space for
thinking is extremely important for him to remain human. However, feeling
completely free in your thoughts is easier when you are alone than when you are
with others. In principle, you can present yourself to others in one way and think
in another way, keeping your thoughts, literally, to yourself. However, as
Wolfgang Sofsky points out, "[s]elf-representations not only tell us who
someone is. They also conceal his intentions, thoughts, or feelings. Staging one's
own inner life is a particularly delicate task... . As a rule, people reveal more
than they can control."" Indeed, to perceptive observers, people "innumerable
times betray their most secret thoughts and qualities, not only although, but often
because, they anxiously try to guard them."S2

48

FERRANDO MANTOVANI, DIRITo PENALE. PARTE SPECIALE I. DELrrrI

CONTRO LA PERSONA

585 (5th ed., CEDAM 2013) (translated); see also Koops et al., supra note 38, at 546-48.
49
The separation of mind and body in this section is not intended to suggest dualism (in fact,
there are close connections between violations of privacy of mind and privacy of body), but it
serves the pragmatic goal of showing different aspects and different emphases of mental privacy
and bodily privacy.
50
For a discussion of the relationship between freedom of mind and privacy, see generally
NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015).

s1
SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 96-97. See also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 34, at 205-06
(arguing that the "general right of the individual to be let alone" comprises "the protection afforded
to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions," based on the principle of inviolate personality, and that
and these "thoughts, emotions, and sensations ... should receive the same protection, whether
expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in facial expression").
52

GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 323-24 (Kurt H. Wolff transl. & ed.,

The Free Press 1950) (1908) (emphasis in original).
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Moreover, thoughts may not only be inferred from outside appearances,
they may also be influenced in a way that someone can no longer be said to be
herself.5 3 This is what Winston ultimately experiences, in the last part of Nineteen
Eighty-Four where he is brainwashed-a far more harrowing part of the novel
than those depicting ubiquitous surveillance:
'They can't get inside you,' she had said. But they could get
inside you. 'What happens to you here isfor ever,' O'Brien had
said. That was a true word.... But it was all right, the struggle
was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big
Brother.s4
If the mind is no longer a space in which you can be yourselves, then
privacy is truly, definitively, lost.
ii.

Mental Bubble

A related but slightly different type of space is the mental bubble: the
space most typically inhabited when you are, as the expression has it, "lost in
thought" or "absent-minded," that is, when your body is here but your mind is
"elsewhere." When someone snaps their fingers in your face, your mind returns
to the here and now of the body. While thoughts may be seen as being contained
in the (hyper)space bounded by the skull, the mental bubble stretches beyond the
skull to some physical distance surrounding the person-a psychological
equivalent of personal space. 5 When someone is "lost in thought," there is an
invisible barrier surrounding her that suggests to others to keep some-physical
and behavioral- distance lest they disturb her.
The mental bubble is associated with the mechanism of psychological
distance. This mechanism allows people to set "necessary boundaries of mental
distance in interpersonal situations ranging from the most intimate to the most
formal and public." 6 The boundaries of mental bubbles are set when someone
"withdraw[s] into privacy" as expressed by "facial expressions, bodily gestures,
conventions like changing the subject, and by exchanging meaning in ways
which exclude others present, such as private words, jokes, winks, and
grimaces."" Mental bubbles are therefore not limited to situations of being "lost
in thought;" they also play in social interactions where people want their

5
See SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 14 (observing that "[tjotalitarianism attacked the private
sphere, because it sought to eradicate any independent thinking"), 109 ("People can always
withdraw into their inner worlds, into the private realm of the imagination, to which no one else
has direct access. Thought control is directed against this bastion.").
54
ORWELL, supra note 1, at 250, 256 (emphasis in original).
5
See infra Section III.A.2.ii.
56

WESTIN, supra note 4, at 38.

5

Id. at 39 (quoting Alan Bates, Privacy-A Useful Concept?, 42 Soc. FORCES 429,432).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss2/8

14

Koops: Privacy Spaces

2018]

PRIVACYSPACES

625

communication partners or by-standers not to penetrate into their inner being.
Interestingly, in Westin's conception of psychological distance, this is a
mechanism of reserve enacted by others rather than by the person herself: it is
the communication partners and by-standers who create psychological distance
to respect the privacy of the person when she indicates a desire for withdrawal
into privacy, or simply because of social conventions of propriety." By not
penetrating through someone's mental bubble, people preserve the other's
privacy, and allow them to concentrate on a private activity, such as reading,
writing, or smartphone-gazing.5 9
Mental bubbles are also the main space for another aspect of privacy:
freedom from intrusion by undesired sensory signals. This is what so-called
"nuisance laws" aim to protect against. The best-known example is noise, a
major theme in earlier privacy literature,"o but mental bubbles can also be pierced
by unwanted smells or sights." Freedom from undesired sensory perceptions not
only allows you to pursue private thoughts, but is also relevant for feeling
comfortably yourself in human interactions. Hall has noted how the American
"extensive use of deodorants and the suppression of odor in public places results
in a land of olfactory blandness and sameness,"62 which creates problems if an
American communicates with people from different olfactory cultures.
Mental bubbles can take diverse shapes in different settings (and
therefore may also have different boundaries or different boundary-markers). An

58
See also SIMMEL, supra note 52, at 322 (distinguishing "an intellectual private-property,
whose violation effects a lesion of the ego in its very center. Discretion is nothing but the feeling
that there exists a right in regard to the sphere of the immediate life contents . . . but conventionally
and discreetly, the other individual, nevertheless, does not trespass it by questions or other
invasions").
s9
Cf Sommer, supra note 16, at 656 (noting that "typing on a keyboard, like reading, is a
silent, self-absorbed activity that would be only minimally affected by the close presence of other
people").
6
See, e.g., Bruno Bettelheim, Some Comments on Privacy, in SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS
399 (1979) (previously unpublished paper originally presented in 1966). He begins this essay by
discussing "innocuous invasions of my private domain" such as being "quite annoyed if I have to
listen to some music in an elevator or airplane, because it may jar with my mood of the moment,
stop me from pursuing private thoughts, or interfere with a conversation," annoyances "indicative
of a much larger issue," namely the freedom to decide for yourself which music you want to hear.
Id.
61
See Warren & Brandeis, supranote 34, at 194 & n.2 (noting that the law of nuisance offers
"qualified protection of the individual against offensive noises and odors, against dust and smoke,
and excessive vibration[s]" and that this "involves also a recognition of the value of human
sensations").
62
HALL, supra note 16, at 45.
6
Id. at 49 (noting how an American traveling in Mediterranean or Arab countries
"experiences difficulty when he is within olfactory range of another person with whom he is not
on close terms . . and has trouble paying attention to what is being said and at the same time
coping with his feelings").
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historically important example is the religious mental bubble in which people
withdraw to communicate with a higher being. To achieve the isolation necessary
for "the contemplative and holy mood for religious communication," someone
"seeks privacy-usually by physical solitude in forest, beach, or church, but also
by psychological isolation through self-induced trance or reverie, or even
dreams, if the individual cannot escape the physical presence of others."'
Another, more recent type of mental bubble is the acoustic cocoon in
which increasing numbers of people are withdrawing when moving around in
public spaces, afforded by wearable music players and comfortable earphones.
Apparently, for many, an acoustic cocoon enhances the feeling that they can be
themselves while moving around in public, particularly in crowded, noisy
surroundings that would otherwise distract them from being in the personal zone
that they, at that moment, like to be in. Interestingly, people "involved in acoustic
cocooning in public space" feel less visible to others: "[b]locking out unwanted
sounds ... and playing one's desired music thus has the remarkable effect of
feeling oneself 'out of view'-a paradoxical auditory retreat from other people's
views.""s This seemingly synesthetic effect might be due to the fact that people
shutting out others' sounds may feel others to be less close than they actually are:
at a distance where voices speaking at normal level cannot be heard-say ten
meters or more-also details of the person's face can no longer be seen,66 so that
withdrawing into an acoustic cocoon might give people a feeling that they are
also no longer a visibly recognizable or noteworthy individual.
iii.

Personal Writings and Other Expressions of the Mind

The diary is an important type of privacy space, as we have seen with
Winston Smith. It is the prototype of purely private expressions of the mind."
Similar to conversations you can have with yourself within your mind, you can
also talk with yourself on paper-an important form of emotional release, of

6

WESTIN, supra note 4, at 19 (citation omitted).

65

SOUND AND SAFE: A HISTORY OF LISTENING BEHIND THE WHEEL 189 (Karin Bijsterveld et

al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter SOUND AND SAFE] (referring to findings of MICHAEL BULL, SOUND
MOVES: IPOD CULTURE AND URBAN EXPERIENCE (2007)).
66
See HALL, supra note 16, at 125.
67
To be sure, not all diaries are written as purely private expressions; they can also be intended
for others or even for publication. Then, the diary is not a space in the personal zone, but in the
intimate or public zone of social life. Also in those zones, however, a diary is still eminently a
space in which you can be yourselves. See how Henri-Fr6d6ric Amiel (writing almost 17,000 diary
pages) in 1864 expressed his relation to his diary:

It is my dialogue, my society, my companion, my confidant. It is also my
consolation, my memory, my scapegoat, my echo, the reservoir of my intimate
experiences, my psychological itinerary, my protection against the mildew of
thought, my excuse for living, almost the only useful thing I can leave behind.
GAY, supra note 40, at 263.
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putting one's thoughts in order, of making sense of what happened, or of
constructing the narrative that you want to remember of special or ordinary
events-in short, of finding out who you are and who you want to be. The diary
and other private writings are spaces: they are physical objects with a particular
location and locale; intrusions into these spaces (such as opening the diary,
leafing through the letters stored in someone's desk drawer, or shoulder-surfing
to snoop on what someone is privately writing) will usually be experienced as
serious privacy violations.
The importance of the diary can be seen in the fact that Gay structures
his history of nineteenth-century bourgeois culture around Arthur Schnitzler,
aged 16, finding that his father has discovered and read his diary, a "violation of
his boyish private space [that] rankled and helped to shape his outlook on the
world."'6 For Schnitzler (as for many others), the diary was a means to acquire
self-knowledge,69 and the "struggle over the sanctity of diaries" was a major
arena in the nineteenth-century conquest of privacy spaces.7 0 The diary was (and
is) an important space to be free from the judgement of others:" "[a] diary did
not criticize, it did not bully, it did not complain, it did not betray secrets."7 2 As
in your thoughts, in your diary, you can be truly yourself.
More broadly, the protection of personal papers, including letters written
and received as well as diaries and other personal notes, was a key aspect of
nineteenth- and twentieth-century privacy. As Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis argued, the right to privacy should protect "personal writings and any
other productions of the intellect or of the emotions."73 This fact is fading from
collective memory in privacy theory, having been pushed aside by a focus on
secrecy of communications, as communications media have grown in importance
and variety. However, it bears remembrance, because personal papers, written or
read in seclusion and not intended for others' eyes, play a key role in identitybuilding.7 4 The fact that writers regarded confidential letters and intimate diaries
"as nothing less than sacrosanct"" crystallized into a strong legal protection of
writings and other papers in the nineteenth century. In 1849, an English court
held that the common law "shelters the privacy and seclusion of thought and

68

Id. at xxix.

69

1d. at 279.

Id. at 261.
Cf Jeffery L. Johnson, Privacy and the Judgment of Others, 23 J. VALUE INQUIRY 157
(conceptualizing privacy as freedom from judgement of others).
72
GAY, supranote 40, at 264.
73
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 34, at 213.
74
Cf GAY, supra note 40, at 260-61 (observing how "[p]rivacy-a desk with a locked drawer,
unsupervised correspondence, a diary kept inviolate, or, best of all, a room of one's own" is
important for growing up, enabling adolescents "to assert their private space," and that, towards
1900, "parents were well advised ... to respect their children's privacy") (emphasis added).
75
Id. at 254.
70
71
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sentiments committed to writing, and desired by the author to remain not
generally known.""6 In Germany, governmental investigation of private papers
was seen as "a violation of the most holy right to secrecy, as a baneful spying of
thoughts, as an unmediated forcing to tell the most secret thoughts that one has
only to justify to God."7 7 David Simons, the main Dutch commentator on
criminal procedure around 1900, thought that, although times had changed since
the early nineteenth century, there still should be protection "of papers and
documents, that possibly contain old and venerable family secrets or intimate
thoughts, which one perhaps hardly even dares to reveal to oneself."
Legal protection of papers served to foster the space for expressing one's
thoughts in private. In the course of the twentieth century, the emphasis in legal
protection may have shifted from papers to correspondence, particularly during
transit; and nowadays, in several legal systems, privately kept papers are no
longer treated as a specially protected space but rather as any other object that
can be uncovered during a house search. 9 Other systems, however, retain
constitutional protection for papers alongside correspondence.80 One may
assume that it is still important for people to develop themselves by ordering
their thoughts in private writings, so that, I would argue, privately kept personal
writings remain an important privacy space also in the twenty-first century.

Warren & Brandeis, supranote 34, at 200 n.3 (quoting Knight Bruce, V.C., in Prince Albert
v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 695).
7
Mittermaier (1821), quoted in D. Simons, Papieronderzoekin strafzaken, in HANDELINGEN
DERNEDERLANDSCHE JURISTEN-VEREENIGING 356 (1888) (translated).
78
Id at 358 (translated); see also J. DE BOSCH KEMPER, WETBOEK VAN STRAFVORDERING,
76

NAAR DESZELFS BEGINSELEN ONTWIKKELD EN IN VERBAND GEBRAGT MET DE ALGEMEENE
REGTSGELEERDHEiD, DEEL 11 184 (1840) (explaining that the rationale of the additional protection

of papers during a search-for which police needed separate court authorization-was that
"writings contain thoughts, and that the State is not authorized to investigate someone's thoughts,
except in relation to the intent of the accused to [committing] the alleged fact" (translated)).
7
For Dutch law, see briefly Bert-Jaap Koops, CriminalInvestigation and Privacy in Dutch
Law 43 (TILT Law & Tech. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 21/2016, 2016),
http://ssrn.comf/abstract=2837483. The only exception is that sealed letters are still protected more
during a search than other objects. See WETBOEK VAN STRAFVORDERING [Code of Criminal
Procedure], art. 102a (Neth.). Some other odd remnants of paper protection linger on, however:
WETBOEK VAN STRAFRECHT [Criminal Code], art. 370(2) (Neth.) penalizes a public official "who,
on the occasion of a search ofplaces, overstepping his authority or failing to observe the formalities
prescribed by law, examines or seizes documents, books or other papers." I am not aware of
substantial national or comparative studies of the complex history of the legal protection ofprivate
papers; it is a topic that merits more attention in privacy scholarship.
80
See Iistavni zdkon 6. 1/1993 Sb., Ostava esk6 Republiky [Constitution of the Czech
Republic], art. 13 (protecting "the confidentiality of letters or otherpapers or records, whether
privatelykept or sent by post or by some other means . , ."(emphasis added)); see also U.S. CONsT.
amend. IV ("[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . .")
(emphasis added). Cf H. Brian Holland, A Cognitive Theory of the Third-PartyDoctrine and
DigitalPapers (Texas A&M University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-46,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3257585.
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2. Body
The body is one of the most straightforward examples of a privacy space.
The body bounded by the skin functions as such, but some of the space around
the body-personal space-and the personal possessions that are an extension of
the body, are also important privacy spaces.
i.

Body as Bounded by Skin

The human skin is one of the clearest possible boundary-markers of a
private space." Penetrating the skin clearly interferes with one of the most
private spaces people have: their literal inner being. "[N]othing seems more
private than people's inner lives, hidden and surrounded by the shell of the
body."82 Being straightforward, the inner body need not be discussed here further
as a privacy space.
What is relevant to note, however, is that "skin" is not a perfect
boundary-marker of the body. Legal systems need to negotiate where to put the
boundary of the inner body in relation to government investigations involving
body material from the outer body (hair, nail clippings, sweat, body tissue left on
objects) and looking inside the body through natural cavities (mouth, nose, ears,
vagina, anus). Some of these will be considered more privacy-invasive than
others, depending partly on whether or not the body is touched (forced shaving
off of a moustache to facilitate a line-up is more invasive than collecting sweat
from a handkerchief to guide sniffer dogs) and on the (socio-cultural) sensitivity
of body parts" (rectal searches will be more invasive than mouth searches).
Another complicating factor is that genetic information-which can be
considered as relating to the core of the human person because it correlates, to a
greater or lesser extent, to key identity features such as looks, personality, and
propensity for diseases-can be derived not only by penetrating the boundary of
the body but equally well from body material taken from the body's outside or
from objects containing traces.

81

Cf SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 37 (seeing the skin as "a living borderline, marking the

difference between the ego and the world"). See also MADANIPOUR, supra note 46, at 239-40
(observing that the "boundary between the private inner space of the self and the public space
outside is the body itself').
82
SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 24. See also id. at 36 (observing that in the untouchability of the
skin "lies the nerve center of everything private").
83

Cf RUSSELL W. BELK, Attachment to Possessions, in PLACE ATTACHMENT 37, 39 (Irwin

Altman & Setha M. Low eds., 1992) [hereinafter Attachment to Possessions] (referring to a study
on "objects (including body parts) according to the degree to which they were seen as part of self'
that found that "skin, genitals, fingers, hands, legs, heart, and eyes were all in the top quartile,"
suggesting that these body parts are more strongly associated with people's sense of self than other
body parts).
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These examples show that, while the body bounded by the skin is
unequivocally a privacy space, certain actions involving body material raise
partly similar questions as physical intrusions into the body, but also somewhat
different questions, and these questions will have to be discussed not only in
terms of bodily integrity but also in terms of other privacy spaces (such as
possessions, home, or public places) in which body material may be collected
and analyzed.
ii.

PersonalSpace

The idea that people carry a certain private space around their body is
widely recognized in the literature, albeit in sometimes different terms.
Seminally, Sommer defines personal space as "an area with an invisible
boundary surrounding the person's body into which intruders may not come....
It has been likened to a snail shell, a soap bubble, an aura, and 'breathing
room."'

84

Ali Madanipour defines it as "the space that a person and the others

observe around his/her body, as the extension of the body[.]"s It is "less private
than mental space, but more private than the intimate space of the home."8 6
The notion of personal space was already envisioned in 1908 by Georg
Simmel, who recognized "that an ideal sphere lies around every human being.
Although differing in size in various directions and differing according to the
person with whom one entertains relations, this sphere cannot be penetrated,
unless the personality value of the individual is thereby destroyed."" It is
frequently mentioned, although not extensively discussed, in privacy literature,"
and sometimes also recognized as such in law. 9 The main conceptualization of
personal space can be found in Edward Hall's discussion of "distances in man,"
where he distinguished four types of distance, each in two variants, near and

8
ALTMAN, supra note 31, at 53 (quoting R. SOMMER, PERSONAL SPACE 26 (1969)). Sommer,
supranote 16, at 656 emphasizes that personal space regards the "emotionally charged zone around
the individuals body," which is shaped "more like an hourglass than a circle, with longer distances
in front and rear than at the sides."
85
MADANIPOUR, supra note 46, at 22.
86
Id. at 25.
87
SIMMEL, supra note 52, at 321; see also text accompanying supranote 58.
88
See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 4, at 143 ("By analogy to what Altman described as the
'invisible bubble' that surrounds each embodied individual, we might envision a zone of personal
space that permits (degrees of) unconstrained, unobserved physical and intellectual movement.");

Eu LEDERMAN, INFOCRIME: PROTECTING INFORMATION THROUGH CRIMINAL LAW 72 (2016) ("an

abstract shape that surrounds a person to form a zone of physical privacy"); SOFSKY, supra note
41, at 39 ("The human shape is surrounded by its personal space, an invisible sphere whose scope
changes with population density and the social and material situation.").
89
See, e.g., Uteck, supranote 30, at 95 (mentioning recognition in Canadian law of "a personal
zone of privacy" where "a person is deemed to be surrounded by a space, but, unlike physical
property, this space is not necessarily bounded by tangible barriers").
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far.90 Intimate distance is the small space immediately surrounding the body"the distance of love-making and wrestling" (near variant) or where "hands can
reach and grasp extremities" (far variant)." An uninvited intrusion into intimate
personal space can be extremely disconcerting; as one of Hall's American
respondents expressed the experience of communicating with a foreigner with a
different sense of personal distance: "They put their face so close it feels like
they're insideyou."92 Roughly up to one meter surrounding a person," personal
distance refers to the "small protective sphere or bubble that an organism
maintains between itself and others,"94 that is, the space within which people
generally feel comfortable in relation to others in non-intimate social
interactions. When circumstances force people to stand closer, in elevators or
crowded buses, for example, they will use mechanisms of discretion (such as
averting one's eyes and keeping one's arms straight down) to show they do not
intentionally invade others' personal bubbles. Social distance, roughly from one
to four meters outside the body, is usually for conducting impersonal business
and casual social gatherings,95 while public distance, beyond four meters, is
typically for important public figures (with people, for instance, not daring to
come within ten meters ofthe president unless so invited) or for public occasions,
such as public speeches.96
Thus, personal space can be seen as a "series of invisible bubbles"" at
different (context-dependent) distances. For privacy, the bubbles bounded by
intimate and personal distance are especially important, as they constitute two
personal-space bubbles from which one will want to exclude uninvited others.
Nevertheless, also social and public distance may be relevant, if someone comes
too close for the purposes of the context at hand. Moreover, and more
importantly, the distances are not simply geometrical in terms of physical
proximity; rather, they are perceptual distances mediated by different human
senses." Being able to be yourselves within your intimate and personal bubbles
is strongly related to (almost) all senses, including touch and smell; in contrast,
social and public distances are bridged particularly by vision and sound. You
may well experience a stare or shout across five meters as an invasion of your

9
91

HALL, supranote 16, at 113-29.
Id. at 117.

92

Id. at 118 (emphasis in original).
9
The indication of distances is based on Hall's observations of mainly Caucasian American
middle-class professionals and therefore is purely indicative; the distances will vary for groups
with different "proxemic patterns." See id. at 116.
94

Id at 119.

9s
96

Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 123-25.

9
Id. at 129.
9
Id. at 181 ("Man's sense of space is a synthesis of many sensory inputs: visual, auditory,
kinesthetic, olfactory, and thermal.").
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personal space, whereas someone standing close to you in the elevator with eyes
averted and arms down (and not wearing a penetrating cologne) can be felt to be
respecting your personal space.
Although I position personal space in the personal zone (because it
directly relates to the human body), it should be noted that it functions as such in
all zones of social interaction. Personal space is portable and accompanies the
person wherever she goes." It is, therefore, a key privacy space also in public.
iii.

PersonalPossessions: The Extended Self

Simmel observed that "material property is, so to speak, an extension of
the ego."" Possessions "can give us a sense of who we are" 01 and thus are
important in identity construction; they "enhance our feeling of being in control
of our environment, strengthen our self-concept, increase our self-confidence,
provide us with feelings of security, and allow us to communicate our identity to
ourself [sic] and others."102 People are attached to favorite possessions primarily
because they serve "symbolic self-expression and memory 'marking'[,]" 0 3 and
the uncontrolled loss of property can be experienced as a "loss of self."" Thus,
they are part of the extended self, a notion advanced by Belk, as a "nested set of
concentric selves resembling Russian mitrushka dolls."' Individual possessions
belong to Belk's intermediate layer of extended self (the innermost self being
unextended, and the outermost self consisting of collective possessions)."
The extended self includes personal belongings carried on or close to the
body, or otherwise accessible only to the person (e.g., in a locker of which the
person carries the key).0 7 Personal effects such as "jackets, hats, gloves,

supra note 46, at 33;

99

MADANIPOUR,

100

SIMMEL, supra note 52, at 322.

SOFSKY,

supra note 41, at 40.

Attachment to Possessions, supranote 83, at 37.
Id at 45 (referring to M. Csikszentmihalyi, The Symbolic Function ofPossessions,presented
at APA meetings, Washington, DC, August 1982).
103
Id. at 42.
10
Id at 52 (observing that only "when there is control over disposition and the ability to
employ disposition rituals ... is the loss of highly cathected possessions likely to be nontraumatic .. .. When we lack control over this process of disacquisition, it [will] be perceived as a
loss of self, but when we control the disacquisition, it can be a source of identity preservation")
(references omitted).
105
Id. at 42.
106
Id.
1o?
Richard B. Parker, A Definition ofPrivacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 281 (1974) (defining
privacy as "control over when and by whom the various parts of us can be sensed by others" and
defining "parts of us" as "primarily what is spatially associated. The objects which are 'parts of
us' are objects we usually keep with us or locked up in a place accessible only to us"). See also
Adam Moore, Defining Privacy, 39 J. OF Soc. PHIL. 411, 420.
101

102
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cigarette packs, matches, handbags and what they contain, and parcels"' are
important for their "value in relation to one's identity" rather than their material
value, 09 and possessions such as "casual clothes, vehicle, books, sporting goods,
jewelry, heirlooms, wallet and purse contents" score high on "self' ratings. 10
Nowadays, smartphones will be a highly important part of the extended self in
this sense; their loss can be experienced as losing a part of oneself, almost as
serious as losing a body part."'
The extended self s relevance for privacy is that possessions valuable for
identity construction that are carried close to the body, or otherwise only
accessible to the person, reside in personal space, falling within the distance
bounded by the intimate or personal bubble,112 or otherwise being experienced
as part of the self and hence as off-limits to others, unless they are invited to
touch or observe the item.113
3. A Room of One's Own
A "room of one's own" is probably the most concrete physical place in
the personal zone where someone can experience privacy.1 14 It provides a refuge
that

108

GOFFMAN, supranote 46, at 38.

SOFSKY, supranote 41, at 41.
Attachment to Possessions, supra note 83, at 41.
II Cf Belk, supra note 5, at 492 (arguing that mobile phones are "for many today our most
relevant identity-kit," an identity-kit being what "people carry with them in order to feel secure in
their self-identity and presentation of self").
112
See supra Section III.A.2.ii.
113
GOFFMAN, supra note 46, at 42 remarks that "personal effects, constituting a preserve in
their own right, are frequently employed as markers [i.e., signifying a claim to a preserve]; moving
them or even touching them is something like touching their owner's body, and such acts are
avoided in many circumstances or performed with suitable circumspection."
Note that some privacy spaces discussed below, such as cars and homes, infra, Section III.B, are
also material possessions, functioning as containers of private life in a broader sense. Such spaces
thus function as privacy spaces in two ways, both as special types of places in the intimate zone
and as material possessions with a perimeter denoting the boundaries of private property. Cf
SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 86-87: "The power of disposal over things that belong only to oneself
marks out one's place in the world. It creates a sphere to which no one else is allowed access, a
safe realm of action in which the individual can experience the effectiveness of his acts and develop
self-confidence.... Through mutual recognition of property, citizens guarantee their private
spheres."
114 A reference will be expected here to VIRGINIA WOOLF, A RooM OF ONE'S OwN (Vintage
Books 2001) (1929), but the novella/essay is about property ("five hundred a year", passim) rather
than privacy. According to Virginia Woolf, it is primarily material and social independence that
enables women to write and be themselves in writing. Id. Nevertheless, a room of one's own will
also help women to foster peace of mind and autonomy: "a lock on the door means the power to
think for oneself." Id. at 92.
109
110
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allows one to temporarily opt out of society and find a place of
peace and tranquility where one can indulge one's inclinations,
lose oneself in one's thoughts, work out secret projects, care for
one's body, or do nothing at all, without being urged by anyone
to act, speak, or work.'
In short, in your own room, you can truly be yourselves, in all senses of
being let alone: backstage relaxation from playing social roles, having no fear of
observation or judgement of others, and having utmost control over information
flows. Being as straightforward a privacy space as the body bounded by the skin,
it need not be elaborated here--except perhaps to note that for most of history, a
room of one's own was a luxury that only the affluent could afford."'
B.

Intimate Zone

The intimate zone of social life is characterized by persons in settings
involving close relationships, typically between family and close friends.' 17
Spaces in this zone involve settings, usually closed-off in some sense, where
people typically develop and enact intimate life,"' including sexual relations,
bonding, and sharing deeply personal information.
1.

Home

Even more than the room of one's own, the home is perhaps the most
typical and best-known privacy space. It is an eminent place for being yourself,
both alone and with intimate others, because "we become attached to the home
as a symbol of our bibliography, an expression of self, and a source of
security."" 9 How close the home is to the self can be seen by how people often
feel after a burglary, even when little has been taken: "a feeling of invasion of
self much akin to rape."' 20 As with the room of one's own, however, it should be
noted that the "harmonious ideal of the cozy, secure home"' 2 ' is a relatively

SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 69.
See GAY, supra 40, at 269-70 (noting that in the nineteenth century, the "most elementary
requirement for domestic privacy was . .. a room of one's own, something that . .. the poor could
never afford" and that "the considerate allocation of private space, though widespread, was not a
uniform practice"); SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 67 (noting that "[o]nly in the second half of the
twentieth century did the majority of the population acquire more private space. Rooms became
larger; intimacy was democratized").
117
See Koops et al., supra note 38, at 548-50.
118
Cf JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 10 (1992) (defining an intimate
activity or action as one that "draws its meaning and value from the agent's love, care, or liking").
119
Attachment to Possessions,supra note 83, at 39.
120
Id. at 51 (with references).
121
SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 65.
115

116
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recent invention and that the home as we know it (with different rooms dedicated
to specific purposes, corridors, and in-home toilets) became available and
affordable to most people only in the course of the twentieth century. 122
Moreover, home cultures vary greatly, and the notion of the home as "my castle"
and therefore as a pre-eminent privacy space may be stronger in, roughly,
northern ("home") countries than in, roughly, southern ("house") countries. 123
There are also cultural differences as to what constitutes being "in" or "outside"
the home. 12 4
As a privacy space, the home has a hybrid function. Sometimes, or for
some, it functions as a secluded place in the personal zone, like the room of one's
own or personal space;1 25 at other times, or for others, it functions as a place for
intimate relations. Thus, "when the home is shared with other members of the
household, the space becomes more stratified to create zones of comfort and
privacy for household members. Here some areas at some times may become the
extended personal space and the rest of the home negotiated, interpersonal
space."l 26 Moreover, not only does the home include both personal and intimate
interpersonal spaces, it also includes some semi-private or even public spacesthose accessible to, and often intended for, receiving visitors or for public
display. Parlors and unscreened windows can also display "the 6clat of that overt
portion of [people's] life that is carried on before the eyes of observers."127 Not
all of the home is strictly private, therefore-but it always includes places to
withdraw into when you feel the need to be with yourself, or to be intimate with
chosen others.

Id. at 65-67; see also GAY, supra note 40, at 268-72; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 281.
123
See JuDITH FLANDERS, THE MAKING OF HOME 3-4 (Atlantic Books 2014) (discerning a
distinction between "home" countries, which have clearly distinct words (and thus concepts) for
home and house, and "house" countries, which apply the same word for home and house; the latter
are "societies where the community space, the town, village or hamlet, is the canvas on which life
is painted, and where an individual house is only a more private area within that primary space,"
while the former are "societies where the house is the focal point, while the town, village or hamlet
functions mainly as the route through which one passes in order to reach the essential privacies of
the houses").
124
See HALL, supra note 16, at 133 (observing that "[t]alking through a screen door while
standing outside a house is not considered by most Americans as being inside the house or room
in any sense of the word. If one is standing on the threshold holding the door open and talking to
someone inside, it is still ... experienced as being outside.... None of these American spatial
considerations is valid in northern Germany. In every instance where the American would consider
himself outside he has already entered the German's territory") (emphasis in original).
125
MADANIPOUR, supra note 46, at 25 ("When the home is the living place of a single person,
the boundaries of personal space may be extended so that the two overlap, for the space of the
home and personal space of the body become one and the same.").
126
Id.
122

127

GAY, supra note 40, at 271-72 (quoting THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEIsURE

CLASS 112-13 (1899)).
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While possessions can belong to personal space,1 2 8 objects in the home
also enhance the feeling of being "at home" and thus strengthen it as a space in
which you can be yourselves. A special category that merits attention in this
respect are souvenirs and mementos, with which people seek to "tangibly
memorialize" those parts of their life that they cherish to remember, which are
often key identity-building events and relationships. 129 Belk argues that "our
attachment to souvenirs and mementos help to construct, rather than simply
preserve, an identity."' 0 For the purposes of this Paper, it is important to note
that these identity-building mementos have traditionally been primarily
preserved within the safe space of the home, where they are closest to the person
and best protected against loss."' Now that souvenirs and mementos get
increasingly digitized and mobilized, they are no longer sheltered by the home
but stored in digital spaces-still close and (relatively) well-protected against
loss, but triggering different legal regimes of protection.
2. Private Communications Space
Private communications space helps to develop identity by facilitating
intimate relationships. It includes the spaces of private conversations, letters, and
telecommunications.
i.

PrivateConversation Space

Face-to-face conversation space can be conceptualized as a group
equivalent of personal space, or the personal space of what Goffman calls a
"with", that is, "a party of more than one whose members are perceived to be
'together."' 3 2 It is constituted by the physical space bounded by a visible or
invisible boundary surrounding a group of people engaged in private
conversation into which intruders may not come. It usually takes place at social
distance," with voice level and eye movement being modulated depending on
the closeness of by-standers or outsiders, to demonstrate the privateness of the
conversation.
Private conversation space belongs to the intimate zone because it
shelters the exchange of possibly intimate or sensitive information, and because

128
129
130

Supra Section ILI.A.2.ii.
Attachment to Possessions,supra note 83, at 40.
Id. (emphasis in original).

The most important mementos-the photograph or hair lock of one's beloved-are kept
even more closely, carried on the person in wallet, purse, or locket; but for physical objects, there
are natural limitations to what one can carry along. Hence, most mementos (photo albums,
children's drawings, travel souvenirs) will be left safely stored at home.
132
RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 46, at 19.
133
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
131
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it is a vital part of the establishment of close and intimate relationships, both of
which are key parts of identity-building. However, conversations do not have to
involve highly personal subject matter to be intimate.134 And conversely, people
sometimes talk about deeply personal matters with strangers, particularly in
"certain places where the real world is seemingly held in suspension 'outside'such as trains, boats, and bars-[that] lend themselves to free conversation.""'
Despite their variety, conversation spaces (at least to the extent that people make
an effort to demonstrate a desire to keep the exchange private, e.g., through
whispering or moving closer together when someone else approaches) trigger a
high expectation of privacy. In German law, for example, private conversations
belong to the "core area of private life" (KernbereichprivaterLebensgestaltung)
that is most strongly protected, because-whether in a car, aloof in a restaurant,
or in retreat during a stroll-they capture with some likelihood highly
confidential situations. 3 6
The boundary of a conversation bubble can be relatively visible, for
instance, when people converse in a Goffmanian "stall,""' because stalls have
"external, easily visible, defendable boundaries for a spatial claim." 138 However,
more often the boundaries will be invisible and rather fluid, and depend on
cultural norms.1 39 Then, others keeping their distance will serve "to isolate any
such group and endow it with a protective wall of privacy."' 40
Even when the physical boundaries of a conversation bubble are
respected, however, content can still be overheard, particularly in relatively
crowded places, such as a restaurant with tables placed closely together. This
should trigger a form of civil inattention: "people will act as though they had not

134
Cf SIMMEL, supra note 52, at 126-27 (observing that intimate relations are characterized
not by the content of the relationship but by the fact that participants share something that they

share with no or only few others, which can be quite trivial).
135

WESTIN, supra note 4, at 38

(observing that talking with strangers can provide

"[c]onfessional relief... because what [the stranger] is told will not be repeated in the 'home
sphere' of the person who has confided in him"). Note that according to SIMMEL, supra note 52, at
127, the sharing of "intimate" content with a stranger does not make the relation itself an intimate
one, because it does not lay the basis for an affective structure that characterizes an intimate

relationship.
136
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016, 1 BvR
966/09 (Ger.) at § 176.
See infra Section Il.C.l.ii.
RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 46, at 34.
139
Cf HALL, supra note 16, at 137 (observing that his American students could not express
"the distance at which a third party would intrude on two people who were talking," although they
137

138

would intuitively know when such intrusion would occur, while two German-based students
answered without hesitation that the distance was seven feet).
140
Id. at 132.
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heard."' The same seems to apply when people talk into their cellular phone in
the presence of others: unless conversing so loudly as to give up any pretense at
expecting privacy, the phoning person is nevertheless in a conversation bubble,
even if the conversation partner is elsewhere, and others may be supposed to
respect the privateness of the conversation even if they can actually overhear
everything being said.14 2
ii.

Letters

Letters-also referred to as snail mail, as distinct from electronic
correspondence-have been, in certain periods, a highly important privacy
space, allowing people to extend the space, typified in the personal zone by
diaries,' 43 for expressing themselves on paper. By allowing one or a few selected
others access to their thoughts, emotions, and private affairs, letters help people
to shape their identity, both by putting their mind, memory, and life in some order
and by creating intimate relations through the one-on-one sharing of
information.'"
The space of letters is physical and relatively clearly bounded: by the
sealed envelope. The envelope shields against accidental viewing, the seal
against purposeful acquisition of its contents. The sealed envelope thus performs
an important function when the letter leaves the safety of the sender's home and
before it reaches the safety of the recipient's home: it establishes, symbolically
as much as physically, a secure channel for communications.1 4 5 The space of
letters is therefore primarily shielded off from those to whom the letter is
entrusted: the postal service (which during most of history was a government
institution). Opening of letters by the mail-of its own accord or so ordered by
(another part of) government-was, and is, considered one of the most serious
breaches of privacy. In Carlyle's formulation, it is "vital to us that sealed letters

141
Id. at 133; see also ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES 156 (1963) ("Bystanders
are obliged to refrain from exploiting the communication position in which they find themselves,
and to give visible expression to the participants of the gathering that they are focusing their
attention elsewhere-a courtesy of some complexity, since a too studied inattention to what one is
in a position to overhear can easily spoil the show of inattention.").
142
Note that, at the same time, having a cell-phone conversation within hearing distance of bystanders (or by-sitters) may at the same time constitute a form of nuisance and thus mental-bubble
invasion, supra note 60 and surrounding text, of the latter: "Those nearby, unable to shut out the
various cell phone conversations, feel as if their space has been invaded." See Sommer, supra note
16, at 654.
143
Supra Section II.A.1.iii.
144
As with diaries, see supra note 67, some letters are, of course, written with (potential)
publication in mind, and in those cases, they are important spaces for self-expression and selfpresentation in the semi-private or public zone rather than in the intimate zone.
145
Cf Shapiro, supra note 11, at 278-79 (discussing the "private space of sealed letters" as
they move through public places).
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in an English post-office be ... respected as things sacred," and that opening
them was like pick-pocketing or "still viler and far fataler forms of
scoundrelism." 4 6
However, once the letter is delivered, its fate depends on the recipient's
discretion; now, it is no longer bounded by the sealed envelope, but by the
recipient's mind and the letter's storage place. As with conversations, the content
of what is shared-and this is what typically makes letters intimate-is entrusted
to the care of a particular other person. Trust therefore is crucial in ensuring that
letters serve as a privacy space. 147 To be sure, this trust is frequently betrayed,
but insofar as peoplefeel they can trust the other's discretion, letters offer a space
in which people feel they can be themselves, free from judgement of others and
with sufficient control over the information flow. In this respect, it may also be
significant that letters, in contrast to email and chat messages, are typically oneon-one communications; and as Simmel has argued, a dyadic relationship differs
fundamentally from a triadic (or broader) relationship in that dyads are
characterized by a "pure and immediate reciprocity," which fosters a
substantially stronger and more intimate relationship. 148 It is not for nothing,
then, that the secrecy of letters has been strongly protected in law since the
nineteenth century, and still is-despite the gradual decline in the use and
significance of snail mail in the twenty-first century.
iii.

1 49
Telecommunications

Telecommunications differ from face-to-face communications primarily
in that they are mediated, that is, transported (usually be a service provider) over
a communications channel. In this sense, they are like letters, and
telecommunications space can therefore be seen as an extension of the space
146
Letter from Thomas Carlyle to the Editor of The Times (June 19, 1844), in GAY, supra note
40, at 259.
147
GAY, supra note 40, at 258 ("Trust, in short, became an essential ingredient in the conduct
of correspondence."); SIMMEL, supra note 52, at 352 (observing that letters somehow carry an
intensified subjective expectation of secrecy, although, or perhaps rather because, their very
nature-being intended to be read by another or others-is "opposed to all secrecy.... It is for
this reason, perhaps, that we react to indiscretion concerning letters as to something particularly
ignoble-so that, for subtler ways of feeling, it is the very defenselessness of the letter which
protects its secrecy") (emphasis in original); see also VINCENT, supra note 27, at 21 (noting that
the rise of "[e]pistolary intercourse diminished the dependence of intimacy on physical space. In
return it enlarged the realm of the secret, with all its attraction and vulnerability").
148

SIMMEL, supranote 52, at 136.

This Section discusses telecommunications as a closed-off space for private
communications, a typical violation of which would be wiretapping. Another type of
telecommunications-related privacy violation (more frequently discussed in older than in recent
privacy literature) is the disturbance of unwantedly being called. This is a form of intrusion into
other privacy spaces than discussed here, namely the mental bubble or the home. Supra Sections
III.A.1I.ii, 11.B3.2.i.
149
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afforded by letters and the postal channel. Although perhaps less graspable,
particularly with wireless communications, telecommunications constitute a
physical space much like the postal channel: it consists in physical equipment
and cables or air waves over which the communications are transported, all of
which have a location and locale. The telecommunications channel, as the
backdrop against which communication at a distance is played out, is therefore
an important privacy space.
Over time, with the rise of new telecommunications means, paper-based
correspondence has gradually (but not completely) given way to
telecommunications-based communications.'s Initially, with the telegraph and
the switchboard-operated telephone, the contents of telecommunications were
not shielded, as the letter was, from cognition by the transport company;
telecommunications privacy therefore relied mainly on the discretion of the
transporter's personnel (backed up by legal secrecy obligations). As the
telephone system was automated, however, phone conversations constituted a
privacy space more similar to letters, with information being entrusted over a
relatively closed channel to reach the recipient. This allows one to see telephone
conversations as "a constitutionally protected private zone," 15I even when
conducted from a publicly accessible telephone booth.' 52 As with letters and
face-to-face conversations, phone conversations help people to shape their
identity, by allowing specially selected others access to their thoughts, emotions,
and private affairs, creating intimate relations through the one-on-one sharing of
information.
With newer communications media and applications, such as email,
texting, and chatting, this is also the case when these are used for private
communications; in many ways, these are simply new forms of letters and phone
conversations. (The format affects, of course, what can be and is being
communicated, but this does not diminish the importance of new media as an
important space for identity-building through sharing of information.) A
difference, however, is that these new media afford more easily sharing of
information in a wider circle: messages can be sent to multiple recipients and
forwarded to others.' Given the sociological difference between dyads and

15o
Note how earlier human rights instruments used the term "correspondence" for mediated
communications (e.g., Eur. Conv. on H.R., art. 8; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12),
while more recent instruments use the term "communications" (e.g., Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the Eur. Union, art. 7).
151
NISSENBAUM, supra note 19, at 101.
152
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Shapiro, supranote 11, at 280 (describing
this ruling as effectively extending the home-along with other nominally private places-into
electronic space).
153
This is also possible with letters, of course, but it is far less practicable; the default with
letters is one-to-one communications, whereas the default with email or chats may be coming
closer to one-to-multiple communications.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss2/8

30

Koops: Privacy Spaces

PRIVACY SPACES

2018]

641

groups of three or more,154 this implies that private communications through new
media may be less a privacy space in the intimate zone, but rather more typically
a space in the semi-private zone of social relations.
3. Car
Cars are underestimated in privacy literature as a special privacy space.
Cars are something of a hybrid of personal space, the extended self, a mental
bubble, a room of one's own, and private conversation space; this unique
combination merits conceiving of a car as a privacy space in itself, which I think
should be placed in the intimate zone.'` Sofsky eloquently expresses why it is a
space in which you can be yourselves:
The automobile provides people with a vehicle that they can
arrange as a private interior space.... [E]very individual can
shape his own traveling room. A car is . . . a refuge for mobile
intimacy. As a vehicle it is a public object; as a room it is a
private object. Although it can be looked into from the outside,
one can brush one's teeth undisturbed while waiting for the light
to change, clean one's nose or ears, put on lipstick or comb one's
hair. A conversation inside the car is not heard outside.
Sometimes a car is also a substitute for one's bed at home,
allowing one to take a nap or engage in erotic adventures.s 6
Being able to be yourselves means you can behave without bothering
about others' judgements or observation; as a man with "something of a
weakness for teenage dance music" and practicing Italian sentences stated, it
must be amusing for other drivers to see him "talking behind the wheel and
'gesticulating as if I am completely insane, but who cares, it's my car, it's my
space."'s

Supra text accompanying note 148.
Cf VINCENT, supra note 27, at 12 (observing that not the built environment itself, but rather
moving through one's environment, epitomized by walking, might well be "the principal focus of
the history of the privacy not just in the early part of this survey but through to the twentieth century
when the motor car became the most available location for secluded reflection and discourse"). In
the course of the twentieth century, "the car became a mobile castle, combining the comfort and
the seclusion of the domestic interior with the freedom to escape its confines without ... any
engagement with another individual." Id. at 121.
156
SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 70-71; see also SOUND AND SAFE, supra note 65, at 3 (referring
to a car "as a mobile living room" and "an artifact that provides both mobility and a privatized,
intimate space").
157
SOUND AND SAFE, supra note 65, at 136; see also NISSENBAUM, supra note 19, at 198
(referring to "spheres of mobility" in which "individuals are generally permitted to act at their own
discretion, to be answerable and accountable to no one") (citing Michael Zimmer, The Quest for
the Perfect Search Engine (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University).
154
155
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One reason why cars, more than other means of transport, feel so private
and comfortable is that they provide an eminent "space for 'acoustic cocooning,'
that is: a domain in which people experience privacy and relaxation because the
interior acoustics of cars are pleasant and controllable[.]"'" Also, when (handsfree) communicating with someone outside, people still control "who and what
is sonically able to enter the car. It is like being at home, but with more physical
privacy than the home usually offers.""s9 Similarly to users of portable music
players in their acoustic cocoon,160 drivers also apparently experience "feeling
oneself safe from other people's views, at least on the highway, when dwelling
in one's private sonic bubble."'6
Perhaps because of their hybrid nature, cars are treated quite differently
between and within legal systems. Depending on the context, uninvited entry into
the space of a car might be qualified as, for instance, an intrusion of property, of
something an arrestee has "at hand" (in the context of a search incident to arrest),
or of a place with no particularly heightened privacy expectations; but at times,
it is also considered an intrusion into an intimate and especially protectionworthy space, for example, when it shelters private conversations.' 62
C. Semi-private Zone
The semi-private zone of social life is characterized by social
interactions beyond the intimate sphere that retain a private character, because
they take place in physically closed-off places or otherwise carry some social
expectation of secrecy or discretion.' Within this zone, one can distinguish
between spaces where users themselves can manage a substantial level of
boundary control-making them effectively private places when the space is
occupied and the boundary is marked-and spaces where boundary control is

158

SOUND AND SAFE, supra note 65, at 6.

Id. at 170.
Id at 189.
161
Id.
162
See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016,
1 BvR 966/09 (Ger.) at § 176; CLAUDIO MARINELLI, INTERCETTAZIONI PROCESSUALI E NUOVI MEZZI
DI RICERCA DELLA PROVA 249 (2007) (finding that a "place of private abode"-which has the same
constitutional protection as the home-comprises "all those places that, besides dwelling,
accomplish the function of protecting private life and that are thus destined for repose, feeding,
professional occupations and leisure activities, among which will be included the driver and
passenger compartment of a car used as a rule for transfers from and to a place of work and leisure")
(quoting Cass., Sez. II [Supreme Court, criminal division, section II], 12 March 1998, Riv. pen.
1998, 1177) (translated).
163
See Koops et al., supra note 38, at 550-52.
159
160
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more difficult and where privacy protection relies more on others' discretion than
on boundary management-publicly accessible places. M
1.

Private Places

Private places in the semi-private zone are characterized by the fact that,
although they are not as directly controlled as spaces in the personal or intimate
zone (such as a room of one's own or a home), users can still exercise boundary
control to a significant extent. This is the case in private clubs, temporarily
occupied publicly accessible places, professional privacy spaces, and offices.
i.

Private Clubs

Private clubs are places usually involving dual access control:
organizationally, one has to be member of the club (which may involve more or
less formal procedures), and physically, one has to be allowed into the club
building or room (by showing a membership card or being recognized by the
gatekeeper). This makes them an important privacy space, because they create a
strong feeling of belonging and comfort (symbolized by the club chair) that
fosters members' feeling that they can really be themselves. These selves may
reflect a generalized, relatively comprehensive identity (as with students' or old
boys' networks' clubs linked with longer-term, friendship-like relationships), or
a partial identity (for instance with a gay or lesbian club).
ii.

Temporarily Occupied Publicly Accessible Places

Whereas private clubs are generally spaces dedicated to club meetings,
and thus not open to non-members, there are many places that are open to the
public and owned by others, but that similarly become private territory when they
are temporarily occupied. I see three types of these.
The first are closed-off spaces in which people can withdraw for certain,
possibly intimate, activities, which one might call black boxes. Typical examples
are toilets in publicly accessible places, changing cubicles in clothes stores, and
hotel rooms. For the brief duration of occupation by a particular person, these
become that person's private space-a temporary room of one's own. In contrast
to personal places (such as one's bedroom at home), however, the duration is
generally short and the place is far less personalized because it changes people
with high frequency. Despite being impersonal, intrusion into these temporarily
164
The difference between publicly accessible places (in the semi-private zone) and public
places (in the public zone, infra Section H.D, is that publicly accessible places (such as caf6s) are
open to an undefined group of people but, through natural limitations, not to a potentially extremely
large number of people, and the place's owner may set rules and expel visitors. In contrast, public
places (such as a street) can host large numbers of people and usually have no specific owner-set
rules. There are exceptions, of course, and the difference is gradual, not absolute.
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occupied places can be highly disturbing because of the intimate nature of the
activities typically conducted there, involving nudity, body functions, and, not
seldom, sex. Having privacy in such a black box involves not only freedom from
physical intrusions and surveillance; it also requires discretion on the part of the
professionals who get to see the box's inside, such as cleaning staff finding
condoms, the latest cheap murder mystery, or three empty whisky bottles in the
hotel room's wastebasket.
The second type of temporarily occupied places has a different character:
less intimate, but still in some sense private. These are what Goffman calls a
stall, that is, a "well-bounded space to which individuals can lay temporary
claim, possession being on an all-or-none basis."' Examples are a chair, a table,
a cot, a telephone booth, a desk in a university study room, a seat at a table in a
library, or a bench in the park. When someone occupies such a stall, they are, of
course, in their personal space (which may be more or less wide, depending on
the stall's size but also on the presence and availability of stalls nearby). But
what makes stalls special as a privacy space for someone is that the place remains
theirs even if they (and their personal space) briefly leave it, leaving some marker
behind to indicate their intention to return. "So long as the person using them is
nearby, no one else is allowed to move into them. Small signs indicate that the
[stall] is occupied. People put down their bags, spread out their belongings ....
Restricted [stalls] are relatively stable microspaces for the individual." 66 An
intrusion into this space therefore not only occurs when someone comes too close
to you in your stall (sitting right next to you on the bench in the park, while the
next bench is empty), but also when someone occupies "your" place when you
are visiting the toilet, or picks up the newspaper or book you left to leaf through.
A library may be publicly accessible, a newspaper can be the library's property
and will have public content, and yet, you may still experience a privacy intrusion
when you return from the toilet and see someone standing at your seat reading
your newspaper (marked as "yours" by the water bottle you left on the table).
After all, it is none of their business what you are reading, and you would rather
be let alone than have to ask to have "your" seat and newspaper back.
The third type consists in publicly accessible places that are not solely
occupied or closed off by a particular person but nevertheless carry a heightened
privacy expectation because of the intimate nature of the activity conducted
there-what might be called publicly accessible intimacy bubbles. I am thinking
of communal changing rooms and communal shower areas, for instance in public
swimming pools or in sports clubs, as well as public toilets (public in the sense
of shared, i.e., without visual barriers between toilets). In principle, anyone can
enter these spaces; but they constitute an intimacy bubble because people are not

165

RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 46, at 32.

166

SOFSKY, supra note 41, at 40 (using "boxes" as a synonym for Goffman's "stalls"; I have
replaced the word "box" by "stall" in the quote, to avoid confusion with the first sub-type of
"(black) boxes").
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supposed to share with others what they perceive inside. This is because such
bubbles involve (partial) nudity, which is made visible not for affective but for
functional reasons (one has to change clothes, shower, and urinate somewhere,
after all, and not always is a black box at hand). A person using such an intimacy
bubble cannot control who accesses the space; but she will expect freedom from
surveillance cameras as well as discretion from those sharing the space that they
will not stare at private parts ("when bodies are naked, glances are clothed"),'
graphically describe those private parts or excremental noises to third persons,
or make uninvited recordings of these.
iii.

ProfessionalPrivacy Spaces

A third type of private space in the semi-private zone consists in places
that are private because a special professional relationship is enacted there:
professional privacy spaces. These are places to which people go and entrust
themselves, relying on professional secrecy and discretion so that they can be
themselves even when they reveal vulnerable parts of themselves.
One example is the hospital room. This space encloses personal space
and private conversation space, but it is also a privacy space in itself because
patients can be visually, aurally, and olfactorily perceived by others outside their
personal space. In a shared hospital room, the hospital bed (sometimes closedoff by a curtain) will function much like a stall for other patients and their
visitors, who are not supposed to come too close, to stare, or attentively listen
unless so invited; jointly, the patients' beds will also function as an intimacy
bubble. Similarly, a hospital room of one's own functions much as a black box
into which uninvited others are not supposed to enter. However, the hospital
room functions differently in relation to medical staff: they can enter without
knocking whenever they like, and they can look, listen, and smell as much as
they want to satisfy their (medical) curiosity. Nevertheless, this does not have to
inhibit patients' behavior and sense of belonging, because they can rely on the
staff's discretion and professional secrecy (strongly backed up by disciplinary
and legal norms) to use what they perceive only and strictly within the medical
context. This ensures that, also in hospital rooms, in vulnerable and possibly
embarrassing circumstances, patients can be themselves (at least in their role as
patients-some aspects of identity may have to be temporarily suppressed or
hidden; after all, a hospital room, even a private one, is not a room of one's own).
A similar example, in a different context, is the public library, where
people can go to access information to read in private. The library is a place for
"open inquiry without having the subject of one's interest examined or

167
RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 46, at 46, 59 (observing that when "two men are urinating
next to each other, their eyes will have a very narrow surface territory that will be safe").

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

35

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 8

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

646

[Vol. 121

scrutinized by others."1 68 But because the library is also a service space, library
staff should assist users in their search for the (type of) material they want to
access; to avoid a chilling effect on reading habits, library professionals have
professional standards for keeping user information confidential.'" In the words
of the American Library Association's policy on privacy, "patrons have the right
to use a library without any inferences made between their reading habits and
their behavior." 7 0 Thus, although the library is a publicly accessible place, it is
also a particular professional privacy space.
Another type of professional privacy space are the places in which
conversations are held that are covered by obligations of professional secrecy.
These might be termed "professional black boxes," because they are a special
type of black box intro which a client and professional can withdraw for
(professionally) intimate exchanges. These are typically the offices of doctors,
lawyers, and notaries, and the confession booth. Such conversations can also be
held, however, outside the professional's dedicated working place, for instance,
in a car, on the street, or a bench in the park. These can equally serve as
professional black boxes, although only in the absence of designated boundarymarkers, both parties will have to take care that by-standers and passers-by are
out of hearing distance.
The privacy space then functions partly as private conversation space (to
which uninvited others should not come too close), but it is more than that: the
trust that the conversation partner will not disclose the shared information to
others (unless where relevant and necessary for professional reasons) is much
stronger in a professional privacy space, making it more of a conversation black
box than a conversation bubble. Professional secrecy offers a strong safeguard
that people feel they can be themselves when talking with the professional. They
may even show parts of themselves that they might otherwise hide even from
themselves, when they bare themselves in front of their confessor or
'

psychoanalyst.' 7

A derivative type of professional privacy space may be the meeting
places for therapeutic group sessions, such as Alcoholics Anonymous or crime
victims discussing their experiences, or for religious gatherings, particularly of
vulnerable or underground sects. These have aspects of a private club, but
similarly to professional black boxes, they carry a stronger expectation that

168
RICHARDS, supra note 50, at 178 (quoting Candace Morgan et al., Privacy and
Confidentiality in Libraries, in AM. LIBRARY Ass'N, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM MANUAL 402, 402
(7th ed. 2006)).
169
Id at 179 (citing Privacy: An Interpretationof the Library Bill of Rights, in AM. LIBRARY
Ass'N, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM MANUAL, 190, 192-93).

170

Id

171

Cf GAY, supranote 40, at 276 (calling psychoanalysis "the most private human recesses ...
for two").

-privacy
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confidences shared within this space will remain confidential (even in the
absence of disciplinary or legal secrecy obligations for participants).
iv.

Offices and Work Spaces

Private life is broader than domestic life, and the workplace is a space
where part of private life in this sense is lived. 17 2 Therefore, although work life
and private life are in some sense distinct (at least in the eyes of most employers
if not of some employees), work activities are private in the sense that they are
not public activities.'7 3 Workplaces are generally also not publicly accessible:
the owner can exercise the right to exclude others. Although workplaces will
differ in the degree to which employees feel "at home" there, they are at least
spaces in which employees should feel they can be themselves as employees,
doing their job in the way that fits them. But offices are also important for social
interactions beyond strictly work-related matters, and employees will often show
more of themselves than their job identity, for instance at the coffee machine or
in the canteen. Protecting privacy at work therefore serves to foster a space in
which employees can be themselves, not only as employees but also as rounded
human beings.
2. Publicly Accessible Places: Caf6s, Public Transport, Etc.
Privacy is important in publicly accessible places, such as caf6s,
restaurants, concert halls, railway stations, and public transport vehicles. In the
famous words of Justice Stewart in Katz v. United States, "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,"17 4 which implies that "what [a person]
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected."l75 I am not sure, however, whether publicly
accessible places also constitute a privacy space as such. Most privacy-relevant
situations within publicly accessible places are covered by privacy spaces

See, e.g., Halford v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20605/92, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 523 (1997).
Offices are considered specially protected privacy spaces in some national legal systems, e.g., in
Italian law, where "places of private abode" (which are legally protected against trespass in much
the same way as dwellings) include non-public places that serve the carrying out of professional,
cultural, and political life, which also covers (non-public) offices. See PAOLA FELICIONI, LE
172

ISPEZIONI E LE PERQUISIZIONI 117 (2d ed. 2012) (observing that the Italian constitutional protection
of the home covers not only dwellings, but also other "places of private abode", a concept with a
very broad scope that comprises "every place 'other' than dwellings, permanently or transiently

destined to the unfolding of private life and of work activities").
173
Except, of course, in the case of public officials. Their work activities may be the public's
business, although-depending on their rank and the political-legal culture-some of their work
activities will remain outside of the public sphere.
174
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
175

Id.
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discussed above: personal spaces (sitting in the bus with your bag in the seat next
to you), mental bubbles (listening, eyes closed, to a Royal Concertgebouw
Orchestra concert), private conversation spaces (talking with your partner over a
pizza, or phoning a friend from the train), and stalls (sitting on a bench in the
station's waiting room, or playing on the pub's pinball machine). Overall, I think
that publicly accessible spaces are not privacy spaces as such, but larger spaces
in which various particular privacy spaces co-exist.
Nevertheless, one might consider some types of publicly accessible
places to have special characteristics, making them some sort of privacy space in
themselves. The library is one such example, given that it is an environment that
as a whole fosters the privacy of pursuing one's very personal interests. Not only
librarians but also fellow users have "a responsibility to maintain an environment
respectful and protective of the privacy of all users.""' Public transport may be
another example, because its character of transit gives a feeling of being "inbetween" without particular obligations to do anything, which stimulates both
mental bubbles (withdrawing into yourself) and relaxed conversations (sharing
intimacies with others'77 ).

Possibly, we should also consider publicly accessible places that are
typically used for social gatherings and conversations as a privacy space of their
own, which in a Habermasian spirit we might term coffee house space.17 8 A
reason to do so is that in caf6s, bars, and pubs, people often come to talk with
friends (creating private conversation spaces) but also to socialize more
generally. Such places function as a "third place," that is, "a place that is neither
the first place of home nor the second place of work, but at which people hang
out, enjoy themselves, and feel accepted.""' In third places, the personal spaces,
mental bubbles, and private conversation spaces seem more fluid and more easily
penetrable in caf6s, bars, and pubs than elsewhere. Gazing at others is more
accepted, or at least more customary, and conversations are more easily started
or joined by others. In that sense, it is no coincidence that coffee houses played
1 The fact that social
an important role in the rise of a bourgeois public sphere.'"

176

RICHARDS, supra note 50 at 179 (quoting Privacy:An Interpretationof the Library Bill of

Rights, supra note 169, at 193).
177
See supra text accompanying note 135.
178

See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 32-33

(Thomas Burger trans., Polity Press 1989) (1962) (discussing the emergence of English coffee
houses in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
1'

Belk, supra note 5, at 486 (referring to the work of RAY OLDENBURG, THE GREAT GOOD

PLACE: CAFtS, COFFEE SHOPS, BOOKSTORES, BARS, HAIR SALONS AND OTHER HANGOUTS AT THE
HEART OF A COMMUNITY (1999)).

180
HABERMAS, supranote 178, at 36 (observing that English coffee houses, French salons, and
German Tischgesellschaften "organized discussion among private people that tended to be
ongoing").
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interaction in coffee houses contributes to the public sphere"' does not imply
that they are not also privacy spaces at the same time. The public in the pub, after
all, may as well be discussing today's drizzle as the challenges of climate change.
It is precisely because people can be themselves when socializing in coffee
houses-and thus enjoying the privacy of coffee house space-that they can (but
do not have to) contribute to public debate, just as many other privacy spaces,
including mental bubbles, personal writings, and private conversation space
contribute to the public sphere in this sense. This is one of the demonstrations of
the social value of privacy.182
D. Public Zone

The public zone of social life is characterized by social interactions in
public places, where they are, in principle, observable to an unrestricted group
of others."' Although this might seem primafacie at odds with privacy, there is
(or used to be) quite some privacy in public because of the fact that de facto,
people often are (or used to be) inconspicuous. One can seek solitude and
intimacy also in public places, and find anonymity in crowds.
1. Public Places
Although public places such as unfamiliar metropolitan spaces can be
alienating, they can be spaces too in which people feel at home. A metropolitan
environment also forms "an external dimension of [the] minds and hearts" of its
inhabitants,' and for many, the local environment, such as one's neighborhood,
is a factor that contributes to their sense of self."8 Given the importance of the
Or to a public sphere. See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to
the CritiqueofActually Existing Democracy, 25/26 Soc. TEXT 56, 60-61 (1990) (observing that
there are also "other, nonliberal, non-bourgeois, competing public spheres" besides Habermas's
public sphere).
182
See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 213 (1995) (arguing that privacy "is also a public value in that it has value not just
to the individual as an individual or to all individuals in common but also to the democratic political
system") (emphasis in original).
183
See Koops et al., supra note 38, at 552-54. See also MADANIPOUR, supra note 46, at 111
(observing that public places and spaces "are public because anyone is entitled to be physically
present in them").
18
Attachment to Possessions, supra note 83, at 43 (quoting EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON,
181

MEANING AND MODERNITY: SOCIAL THEORY IN THE PRAGMATIC ATTITUDE 191 (1986)).

See David M. Hummon, Community Attachment: Local Sentiment and Sense of Place, in
PLACE ATTACHMENT 258, 259 (Irwin Altman & Setha M. Low eds., 1992) (discussing "the ways
locales are imbued with personal and social meanings, and how such symbolic locales can serve
in turn as an important sign or locus of the self' and "the role of the built environment as a
nonverbal medium for the communication of moral reputation, social rank, and other significant
qualities of self') (references omitted).
185
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environments in which people move for the construction of their identity,
"adequate self-realization requires adequate privacy in public," as Sloan and
Wagner have argued, and this requires people to "voluntarily limit their
knowledge of each other as they interact."' 8 6 This happens because, like publicly
accessible places, public places are also larger spaces in which various particular
privacy spaces, such as personal space, the extended self, and private
conversation space, co-exist. Although these privacy spaces-because they are
in public-often have invisible and easily penetrable boundaries, they are often
respected by other people exercising discretion. De facto anonymity also plays
an important role in contributing to people's feeling that they can be themselves
in their transparent privacy spaces: someone walking the streets "is among
people and knows that he is being observed; but unless he is a well-known
celebrity, he does not expect to be personally identified and held to the full rules
of behavior and role that would operate if he were known to those observing him.
In this state the individual is able to merge into the 'situational landscape.'" 87
Moreover, particularly if alternative, closed-off spaces are unavailable,
privacy in public places can cover quite intimate activities, such as being
immersed in subversive or embarrassing reading, love-making in the park or on
the beach, or pouring out one's heart to someone. "Thus, people in crowded
living quarters find privacy outdoors ... in a host of 'public' places where the
necessary solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve can be found.""
This is not to deny that people generally have lower reasonable
expectations of privacy in public; they are, after all, visible. Thus, Prosser could
find in 1960 that someone "has no right to be alone" on the public street and that
"it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than follow him about."'8 9 But this
is a difference of degree and a matter of proportionality rather than a matter of
principle. Persistent, protracted, and obtrusive following of someone in public
will often be considered a substantial privacy intrusion and qualified as stalking.
And as Nissenbaum has observed, moving around in public, we are "[s]een by

186
Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, The Harm in Merely Knowing: Privacy, Complicity,
Surveillance, and the Self, 19 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2015).
187
WESTIN, supranote 4, at 31; see also VINCENT, supranote 27, at 32 (the notion of anonymity

and solitude in urban public space already existed in 1711, when Joseph Addison wrote that, in
view of his "Love of Solitude," he preferred leaving the countryside to retire into town "and get
into the Crowd again as fast as I can, in order to be alone") (quoting JOSEPH ADDISON, SPECTATOR
131 (July 31, 1711)).
188
WESTIN, supranote 4, at 41; cf Fadhila Mazanderani & Ian Brown, Privacyas a Practice:
Exploring the Relational and Spatial Dynamics of HIV-Related Information Seeking, in
COMPUTERS, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION: AN ELEMENT OF CHOICE 262 (Serge Gutwirth et al.
eds., 2011) (observing an "apparent inverting of the private and the public" in London-based HIVpositive African women's search for online HIV information, who preferred to go to Internet caf6s
even if they had Internet access at home, because "often the home was considered the least private
place with regards to HIV").
189
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 391(1960).
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hundreds, noticed by none. Or, if we are noticed, it is by disparate observers,
each taking in only discrete bits of information."' 90 It is only when these discrete
bits of information are accumulated and aggregated that we lose the privacy in
public that we de facto have-or have had, because it is precisely such
aggregation that we are nowadays experiencing with ever more prevalent
surveillance of public places. The knowledge of being on camera and traceable
throughout your movements lessens the experience of public places as a place in
which you can be yourselves.
2. Political Privacy Places
All places are political, in the sense that no place exists that is
intrinsically exempt from the public interest."' In fact, all privacy spaces are also
political spaces, in that they foster citizens' self-development, reflection, and
debate, which contributes to playing the role of citizen and therefore to a wellfunctioning democracy. But this social value of privacy is inherent to privacy
spaces as such; it does not make a particular space a political privacy space. What
I mean with political privacy places as a privacy space is more particular, namely
a place that requires some form of privacy protection for people to be able to
engage in a political act. In other words, a political privacy place is a place where,
through some form of privacy protection, someone can be herself as a political
actor.
This includes places where politicians should be able to be themselves
in their role as politician, for instance, a chamber of parliament or a meeting room
of a local government administration. Generally, such places have few privacy
protections, given the importance of transparency in government,1 92 but there are
situations in which political deliberation places are closed to ensure
confidentiality of communications. One might also see security measures that
restrict access to these places as privacy-protecting measures because they
safeguard the political actors' privacy of body and mind-another instance of the

19

NISSENBAUM, supra note 19, at 117.

Cf the feminist critique of domestic privacy, most emphatically, Catherine MacKinnon, Roe
v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 51 (Jay
L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) (arguing that "[the private] is ... defined by
everything that feminism reveals women have never been allowed to be or have"), and more
nuancedly, ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 54 (1988)
(observing that "many a woman's home life [is] a privacy bane rather than a boon" and that
"women face the problem of overcoming inequitable social and economic patterns that substitute
confinement to the private sphere for meaningful privacy").
192
Illustrative is the remark of Dutch MP Franssen in 1970, discussing the Bill to protect
privacy through criminalizing covert visual observation, and lamenting the entrance of television
in Parliament: "We have gradually grown used to it in this Chamber: nose-picking parliamentarians
will continue to be displayed to the public. That is also something we will have to live with." See
Handelingen II [Parliamentary Discussions, Second Chamber] 22 October 1970, 477 (Neth.)
(translated).
191
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social value of privacy (and of the non-negligible synergy between security and
privacy).
Something of a mirror to these official political places are the places of
public citizen protest, such as the public square where citizens demonstrate for
political purposes. Public places are a space for the exercise of "personal rights
that are both politically and spatially grounded, including the right to ...
assembly and freedom of action in urban open spaces."'91 What makes these
protest places a privacy space is that masking and other forms of anonymity
preservation can be important to ensure that protesting citizens can be themselves
as political agents; freedom to protest as political actor requires freedom from
others' judgement that would implicate other parts of identity.194 The worker and
student should not have to fear being dismissed or expelled because they have
engaged in political protest (as long as they remained within certain limits of law,
of course).
Another, less contested and more typical, political privacy place is the
voting booth, where, at least in most democracies, privacy of the ballot is strictly
safeguarded. "To vote, alone and unobserved: nothing could be a stronger
exemplar of privacy in action.""'
E.

Overview of TraditionalPrivacy Spaces

As this section has shown, the array of traditional privacy spaces is broad
indeed. Given the wide variety, both in types of spaces and in possible
manifestations of these types, it is difficult to graphically represent this array in
a concise way. Nevertheless, I have attempted to put all the discussed spaces in
a graphic overview (Figure 1), using the spectrum of zones of social interactions
(used as a structuring principle abovel96 ) on the horizontal axis. For the vertical
axis, the spectrum of access control versus discretion is a useful heuristic,
because this is a major distinction in the way privacy is or can be protected in
different environmental settings."' The placing of spaces along this vertical axis
is tentative, based on a rough estimation of the relative importance of access
control and discretion to protect privacy in these spaces; no special importance
should be attached to the precise placement along this vertical axis, except
perhaps that it can generally serve to illustrate the relative importance of
discretion for privacy protection in a large number of privacy spaces.

Koops & Galid, supra note 21, at 31.
Cf Michael Nagenborg, Hidden in Plain Sight, in PRIVACY IN PUBLIC SPACE: CONCEPTUAL
AND REGULATORY CHALLENGEs 47 (Tjerk Timan et al. eds. 2017) (discussing the role of masks in
practices of resistance to surveillance).
19s
GAY, supra note 40, at 276.
196
See supra text accompanying note 47.
197
See infra text accompanying note 230.
19

194
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42

Koops: Privacy Spaces

2018]

§

PRIVACY SPACES

653

personal zone

intimate zone

semi-private zone

thoughts

home

black box

room of one's own
4A

public zone

voting
ot
vtn booth

~~car

personal writings

telecommunications
extende self
etnesefbox
private conversation
space

Professional black
private club
work space

political deliberation
place

acoustic cocoon
soletters
personal space

professional privacy
space
intimacy bubble

public place

mental bubble

coffee house space

public protest place

publicly accessible
Place
stall

As the overview shows, privacy matters in a wide range of human
interactions in different spatial settings. Although the array of privacy spaces
might be conceived of as concentric circles,' 98 with mind and body at the center
and moving out through intimate spaces such as the home and car to places in
the semi-private and public zones, this is an oversimplification. The extended
self of the body (including personal possessions carried along) is not necessarily
a more "core" privacy space than a caf6's toilet or a confession booth. Moreover,
privacy spaces are often nested and partly overlapping; coffee house space, for
instance, is a privacy space in itself but also incorporates multiple personal
spaces, private conversation spaces, stalls, and black boxes, all at the same time.
Also, only few spaces are truly backstage, where people can drop role-playing
altogether; most spaces involve the playing of one or more roles in life, and while
some spaces are specifically associated with special roles (such as the analyst's
couch or the voting booth), most spaces involve different partial identities, which
may be triggered at different times, or simultaneously, depending on a host of
factors. All this helps explain why privacy is regularly called context-dependent
and also messy: privacy is often relevant for different aspects of persons and
interactions at the same time. Yet this does not diminish the role of privacy in all
these different spatial settings: regardless of the complexity of the privacy spaces

198

Supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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and the types of interaction involved, privacy still comes down to being able to
play one's relevant role(s) in a certain spatial setting.
When social interactions, over time, shift and adapt to new or changed
environmental settings, this will impact the ways in which privacy can be
experienced by people. In the next Part, I will discuss the implications of the rise
of digital and online spaces of social interaction for people's capacity to have
spaces in which they can feel free to play their relevant role(s).
IV. THE PROBLEM OF DIGITAL PRIVACY SPACES
An adequate discussion of the challenges of digital privacy requires a
book series, which cannot be magically condensed in a few pages. What I can
offer here are some arguments that explain why digital privacy presents a puzzle,
both in descriptive terms of capturing what is happening in digital spaces and in
normative terms of regulating them. These arguments build on the insight that
digital spaces are not radically new, sui generis spaces involving sui generis
practices and norms; they are combinations, adaptations, and extensions of
existing spaces. 199 The physical and the digital are not separate realms, but jointly
part and parcel of the human condition. We live in an onlife world: most of our
life nowadays has an online component, and online activities constitute life
experiences.200 This is the main reason for the long discussion of traditional,
physical privacy spaces in Part III above: to understand and regulate privacy in
digital spaces, we need to place them in the context of the traditional spaces that
they build on, adapt, and combine, forming an altogether onlife world. This
historical context is vital for understanding digital spaces, given

'

the Kantian insight that time and space are both necessary or a
priorimental categories . . . the two are inextricably intertwined.
In other words, we need to remind ourselves to keep
historicizing as much as we spatialize. More than that, we cannot
even begin to engage with spatial questions sensibly unless we
constantly historicize space. 20
What follows is a first reflection on the relevance of recognizing digital
spaces as a complex rehashing of traditional physical spaces of social interaction,
and the importance of studying digital privacy challenges using this insight,
which can function as an invitation for follow-up research.
199

See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.

200

See generally THE ONLIFE MANIFESTO: BEING HUMAN

IN A HYPERCONNECTED ERA (Luciano

Floridi ed. 2014). The term "onlife" is not defined in this manifesto, but is used to characterize a
world in which the distinctions between reality and virtuality, and between human, machine, and
nature are blurred; where information scarcity has given way to information abundance; and where
the primacy of entities has shifted to the primacy of interactions. See also The Onlife Initiative,
The Onhife Manifesto, in THE ONLIFE MANIFESTO 7, 7 (Luciano Floridi ed. 2014).
201
Eeckhout, supra note 39, at 33 (emphasis in original).
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The Complex RelationshipsBetween Digitaland Physical Spaces

A first cluster of arguments relates to the complex relationships between
digital and physical spaces. First, digital spaces collapse traditional privacy
spaces. 2 02 Social networking sites are a key example: 20 3 they combine new
manifestations of many traditional privacy spaces, such as writings and other
expressions of the mind, private communications space, private clubs, group
therapy space, office space, coffee house space, personal and material
possessions (such as digital photos), public places, and political privacy placesall depending, of course, on the affordances of particular social-networking
platforms and how people use these in actual social interactions. Smartphones
are another example: they combine new manifestations of spaces that
traditionally used to function as mental bubbles, personal writings, a room of
one's own, the home, private communications spaces, professional and office
space, public places, material possessions, and political privacy space.
Second, digital spaces sometimes seem, at first sight, an extension of a
certain traditional space while they are actually (also or rather) extensions of
other spaces. For instance, the cloud seems an extension of communications
space (and in law, it is often qualified as such) because it relies on
communications networks. People use the cloud for various purposes, but the
information flow always passes through the telecommunications infrastructure.
Yet some cloud applications have nothing to do with communications: cloud
storage space-the space in the cloud reserved for an individual user-is a space
for storing documents, which serves as an extension of the hard disk of people's
personal computer or smartphone. And the hard disk and smartphone, as storage
space of documents (think of photographs, books, music, diaries, and personal
notes), is an extension of the home (and for some documents, such as agendas
and address books, of the extended self), not of private communications space.
This means that safeguarding privacy in the cloud implies distinguishing
between cloud-based communications and cloud-based document storage, and
that for the latter, analogies should be sought with privacy of documents and
possessions that used to be stored in the home, not with secrecy of
communications. Another example is the environment of massively multiplayer
online games, which would seem a (much elaborated) extension of the living
room and the public park where games are played, or perhaps of clubs for
amateur theatre; these games function, however, also as a "third place"-a
contemporary equivalent of coffee house space, 2 0 involving "a rich sense of

Shapiro, supra note 11, at 276 (observing that partly due to technological innovation, "we
are increasingly confronted by spaces spanning multiple places ... and, conversely, single places
intersecting with multiple spaces," which makes the exercise of mapping privacy onto spaces
"more complex and fuzzy").
203
See supra note 19.
202

204

Supra Section

UI.C.2.
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imagined community" where people can be themselves.20 5 Consequently, the
social value of privacy fostered by these spaces' potential contribution to the
public sphere should not be neglected when analyzing the privacy implications
of multiplayer online games. These are but two examples that underline the need
to be careful in framing digital privacy challenges: the frame must do justice to
historical evolutions of physical into digital spaces, looking for functional
equivalents rather than for evolutions in information carriers or the labels
attached to online spaces.
Third, along with a shift in emphasis from entities to interactions 20 and
a shift from the traditional "space of places" to a "space of flows," 2 0 7 digital
spaces are far more interconnected and interoperable than traditional spaces. This
is afforded by both digitization and networking. As a result, there are fewer
boundaries clearly delimiting digital privacy spaces than can be found in the
traditional "space of places."208 This is not to deny that boundaries exist online:
both territorial boundaries of nation-stateS 209 and virtual boundaries guarded by
access-restricting passwords demarcate the limits of certain digital spaces. Yet
digital spaces tend to be more interconnected, multi-functional, multi-purpose,
and multi-user environments than physical spaces (except, perhaps, the public
square) have ever been.
Fourth, there are significant differences between traditional, physical
settings and online settings in terms of presentation of the self. Goffman
emphasizes that self-presentation involves not only managing the expressions of
the self that one gives, but also those one gives off, through one's general

Extended Self supra note 5, at 486 (referring to findings of Constance A. Steinkuehler and
Dmitri Williams, Where Everybody Knows Your (Screen) Name: Online Games as "ThirdPlaces",
205

11 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 885 (2006)).
206
The Onlife Initiative, Background Document: Rethinking Public Spaces in the Digital
Transition,in THE ONLIFE MANIFESTo 41,46 (Luciano Floridi ed. 2014) (discussing "reversal from
entity's primacy over interactions to interactions' primacy over entities").
207

MANUEL CASTELLS, 1 THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 408-09 (2d ed. 2010). See also

MITCHELL, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing "the shift from a world structured by boundaries and
enclosures to a world increasingly dominated, at every scale, by connections, networks, and
flows").
208
Cf Mc Mahon & Aiken, supra note 39, at 17, 24-25 (explaining the difficulty of
demarcating boundaries online by highlighting an intrinsic tension between the competing drives
of territoriality-which necessitates creating some controllable boundaries-and identity-which
involves a representation of the self that we want others to see; the result is that, in social networks,
"the most exclusive shows are cordoned off by nothing more than a velvet rope"; "Marking out a
unique and personal territory in an environment fundamentally devoted to connection and
association seems like an impossibility").
209
See Bert-Jaap Koops & Morag Goodwin, Cyberspace, the Cloud, and Cross-border
Criminal Investigation: The Limits and Possibilitiesof InternationalLaw, 5 TILBURG L. SCH.
LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES 1 (2014).
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appearance, non-verbal behavior, involuntary facial expressions etcetera. 2 10
Although "given off" expressions are harder to manage than intentional, "given"
expressions, because they include unintentional signs, people are generally
aware of when, how, and to what extent they might give off impressions in
traditional social settings, and of the consequences that may generally attach to
these, on the basis not only of their own life experience, but also of an
evolutionarily developed sense of how others perceive them with their eyes and
ears. For instance, people may subconsciously perceive subtle signs such as a
raised eyebrow of a conversation partner, a slightly turned head or a stare from
across the street to realize that they do not give off their standard impression, and
adjust their appearance accordingly (such as quickly zipping up that fly you
accidentally left open). Thus, people know about the impressions they may give
off in general, if not in every concrete instance, in physical settings, and they
have generally developed some ways to deal with the expressions they give off
there. Now, in digital spaces, you also give off expressions besides the
expressions you intentionally give: these are the metadata that are generated
along with communications and browsing, as well as the data that can be inferred
through online behavioral monitoring. In contrast to physical given-off
expressions, however, people are far less aware of the fact that they give off
expressions online, in the form of data that are inevitably leaked through their
online activities; and even if they are aware of these, there is often little they can
do to adjust their appearance, because they will often have no clue as to how
these given-off expressions may affect their future social relations, nor how they
might adjust their online behavior in order to avoid inferences of information that
counters the self they want to present. Therefore, in studying the implications of
digital spaces for impression management, it is important not only to look at how
people actively present themselves online,2 1' but also to take into account how
metadata and inferred data constitute a digital equivalent of "given-off'
expressions, with an associated challenge for self-presentation constituted by a
lack of awareness, experience, and capacity to manage these.
Finally, there is another reason why being able to be yourselves in digital
spaces is not the same as being able to be yourselves in traditional physical
environments. This is the collapsing and combining of traditional spaces that
occurs in digital spaces. Many traditional places are more or less closely

PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 3, at 2 (distinguishing between expressions someone
gives and those he gives off, as "radically different kinds of sign activity"). Id. at 4 (indicating his
analysis is primarily concerned with the latter, "the non-verbal, presumably unintentional kind,
whether this communication be purposely engineered or not").
211
Which is what the majority of literature on online identity focuses on. See, e.g., Extended
Self, supra note 5, at 490 (offering an excellent summary of changes in the digital self as opposed
to the embodied self ("[ajll in all, the self is much more actively managed, jointly constructed,
interactive, openly disinhibited, confessional, multiply manifest, and influenced by what we and
our avatars do online"), but not discussing the implications of given-off expressions of the online
self through the generation of metadata and inferable data).
210
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associated with one or more partial identities, and they can be-as I have tried to
show in Part III-relatively straightforwardly associated with the personal,
intimate, semi-private, and public zones of social life. In contrast, digital spaces
often trigger different partial identities at the same time, or at different times on
the same platform, and audience segregation-a key element in the presentation
of self in everyday life-is considerably more difficult to achieve online than
offline.2 12 Moreover, because of the abundance of information, the ease of
information flows, and the relative persistence of digitized data over time,2 13
parts of the self disclosed in certain online contexts can reappear in unexpected
ways in social interactions in traditional spatial settings (for instance, when a
prospective employer googles you prior to a job interview), and vice versa,
information derived from observed behavior in meatspace can be used-and reused, aggregated, and profiled-in unexpected ways online. Such unexpected
encounters can even happen in real time, given the overlapping of physical and
digital spaces. This implies that being able to be yourselves in an onlife world
almost requires people to be aware of all their selves all of the time-something
that, even if it were possible, surely has a chilling effect on people's feeling they
can safely be "themselves" in any given situation.
B.

The Role of Social Norms

A second cluster of arguments relates to the social norms applying in
and to digital spaces. As can be seen in the discussion of traditional privacy
spaces,2 14 many of these thrive on social norms that have developed over timeusually decades if not centuries or millennia2 15 -and are relatively strongly
rooted in social practices. Digital spaces, particularly those that have evolved
only in the past decade or so (it bears reminding that (The) Facebook was
launched in 2004 and opened up to the public only in 2006216), have had

212
Id. at 483 ("[T]he challenge of segregating multiple personas is more difficult in a digital
age"). Id. at 490 ("our lessened ability to segregate audiences for our self presentations also means
that we cannot easily present conflicting selves"); Bibi Van den Berg & Ronald Leenes, Audience
Segregation in Social Network Sites, in PROCEEDINGS FOR SOCIALCOM2010/PASSAT2010 1111
(IEEE 2010). See also Mc Mahon & Aiken, supra note 39, at 16-17 (observing that the "online
self' consists of a set of different constellations of the self).
213
Although the meme that "the Internet never forgets" is not true, forgetfulness is much harder
to achieve when perception-based memories are stored externally on digital information carriers
than internally in people's brains. Cf Paulan Korenhof, ForgettingBits and Pieces, in PRIVACY
AND lDE1NTY MANAGEMENT FOR EMERGING SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGIES 127 (Marit Hansen et
al. eds., 2014).
214
Supra Part I.
215
Some mechanisms relating to privacy spaces have evolutionary roots; personal space, supra
Section UI.A.2.ii, is the product of "a lengthy process of gene-culture coevolution through natural
selection," according to Sommer, supra note 16, at 649.
216
Facebook, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss2/8

48

Koops: Privacy Spaces

2018])

PRIVACY SPACES

659

considerably less time to foster the development of social norms and the
embedding of these in online and onlife practices. To be sure, social norms do
exist and develop in digital spaces; but it is often unclear whether and to what
extent these norms reflect the norms and practices of the traditional privacy
spaces of which the digital spaces are extensions and combinations. Digital
platforms, for instance, stimulate sharing of information in ways that go far
beyond information-sharing practices in traditional social environments, leading
to sharing being the norm and shielding being frowned upon."' The discontinuity
effected by the transition to an onlife world results "in a schism, many schisms,
between experience and expectation."m
Moreover, some digital spaces are relatively straightforward extensions
of traditional privacy spaces but involve very different information flows, which
are not (or at least not yet) regulated by an equivalent extension of the applicable
social norms. A clear example is private reading, which is traditionally done in a
mental bubble in the personal zone (which may be nested in a room of one's own,
home, office, coffee house space, or public place). The privacy intrusion into this
space traditionally consists in distraction-snapping the mental bubble-but not
in covertly monitoring the reading nor in systematically profiling someone on
the basis of what one reads, simply because that has practically been hard to do.
With the rise of e-readers, however, private reading may (depending on the
privacy settings and how carefully you read the terms and conditions and check
the appropriate boxes) involve that the e-book provider continuously looks over
your shoulder, monitors your reading progress, notes how you mark favorite text
passages (and distributes or sells these to others), and profiles who you are on
the basis of your reading patterns. No social norm has evolved yet of being let
alone while e-reading, and the privacy of reading is left to the mercy of the
provider's (one-sided and non-negotiable) terms of conditions.1
A similar example, albeit more complex because it also involves changes
in behavior patterns, is music consumption. Traditionally, the consumption of
music (such as listening to one's records or CDs) is a relatively solitary act,
largely played out in one's home, room, and acoustic cocoon, and music
preferences are shared with only a small circle of family and friends. In contrast,
the digitization of music, and particularly the consumption and sharing through
See generally DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE (Alfred A. Knopf 2013) (centering on the slogan
'SHARING IS CARING'). See also Ari Ezra Waldman, Safe SocialSpaces 8, (N.Y.L. Sch. Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 3119735, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119735 (observing that
'in a modem social world in which sharing is, if not mandatory, expected, law and design have a
role to play in making digital spaces safe for everyone').
218
NISSENBAUM, supra note 19, at 231.
219
See RICHARDS, supra note 50, at 129 (discussing the "e-reader paradox" that "e-readers
create an illusion of physical reader privacy" (no-one on the tube notices you are reading Fifty
Shades of Grey) "while they threaten the very existence of any kind of digital reader privacy"
(because Amazon knows all too well not only that but also how you are reading Fifty Shades of
Grey)).
217
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online platforms, affords the sharing of playlists online, which "can say a great
deal more about us than opening the windows and cranking up our stereo."220
This is not as trivial as it may seem, because playlists reach far broader
audiences, and these "can judge others' personalities quite well based on the
music that they listen to."221 Other examples, such as the search engine that is
some sort of onlife extension of the library but has no equivalent professional
standard that no inferences should be made between reading habits and
behavior, 22 2 are yet more complex, because the analogies are more intricate and
the context may require more reflection on what can be considered appropriate
information flows to preserve a space in which you can be yourselves.
The underlying problem might not even be so much that social norms
are slow to evolve, but rather that the involved parties are different. In traditional
privacy spaces, particularly those where people cannot well prevent disclosure
through access control, discretion exercised by communications partners and bystanders plays a primary role.22 3 Such discretion might be asked of online
communications partners and online "by-standers" (although standards of
discretion may differ, as the prevalence of revenge porn suggests); but discretion
can hardly be expected from service providers, particularly not from those whose
business models rely on selling customer data rather than, or besides, selling
products or services. And the problem with most digital spaces is that they are
co-inhabited by service providers, who through terms and conditions to which
customers click their consent in blissful ignorance, often ensure the capability of
accessing information generated in or through the service. Customers do not only
show themselves to digital service providers in their role of customer; they often
reveal information relating to many other partial identities, which may be used,
re-used, aggregated, and profiled in the same as well as in other contexts. The
co-habitation of service providers in digital spaces stands in stark contrast to
traditional physical spaces, where the "space provider" does not usually, and
certainly not systematically, monitor what people do in their space. Hotel owners
may use CCTV in corridors, but not (we hope) in hotel rooms; municipalities
cannot listen in on private conversations you have on a bench in their park; your
employer may monitor your ICT usage, but not the talks at the coffee machine.
This default absence of space providers in most traditional privacy spaces is
reversed in digital spaces; there, the default is rather that the service provider is
inside, having the capacity to take knowledge of what you do and say. Whether
they use this capacity depends on their business model, terms and conditions and
so-called "consent," and, who knows, even on their discretion-but in any case,
not on clearly developed and rooted social norms of acceptable behavior.

220
221
222

223

Extended Self, supra note 5, at 479.
Id
Cf supra note 170 and accompanying text.
Supra Section II.E.
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C. CompoundingTechnologicalDevelopments
A third cluster of arguments relates to other technological developments
besides digitization and online interactions. First, robots are or will soon be
entering many of our traditional spaces, and we will have to negotiate privacy
practices with them (and, of course, with their developers and providers).
Companion and care robots may be cute and cooperative, but they come with
sensors that significantly expand information flows. Moreover, "[t]echnologies
that introduce the equivalent of people into our homes, cars, computers and
mobile devices-places historically experienced as private-threaten our
dwindling opportunities for solitude and self-development."2 24 At the same time,
they may also enhance opportunities for people to be themselves, as people can
feel free from the judgement of robots (although not necessarily from the
judgement of people behind the robot). Robotization will add another layer to the
enmeshing of physical and digital spaces, making an already complex puzzle
even more puzzling.
Second, and similarly, the Internet of Things (loT) will also complicate
the picture because loT devices will further perforate the boundaries of existing
privacy spaces with ever more channels for information flows-from and into
the home, the car, personal space, private places, and public places. Similarly to
robots, but with other dynamics, loT devices will compound the ways in which
physical and digital spaces connect and how people, and their hyperextended
selves, will interact.
Third, and implying another turn of the screw, machine learning and
algorithmic decision-making will affect privacy spaces in ways that are as yet
hard to foresee. We can at least expect that the spatial setting in which humans
move will become more flexible, not to say protean, when algorithms decide
what the environment should look like; this may range from simple A/B testing
in websites you consult225 through changing your room's lighting scheme
according to your (automatically inferred) mood to radically altering the
experience of space through augmented reality applications. Such real-time
adaptations in spatial settings based on behavioral and preferential inferences are
likely to substantially affect whether and to what extent you feel you can be
yourselves in a setting. Adaptable environments might sometimes be alienating
but will probably often also be comforting, enhancing your feeling of being "at
home" or "in place" even in unfamiliar places. But they will also implicate
privacy at a deeper level. It is questionable whether the self you feel you can be
in real-time adaptive environments is really the self or selves that you want to

224
M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology
Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 809, 815 (2010).
225
A/B testing is a business-intelligence method that randomly presents two variants (A and B)
to users to test how different designs affect user behavior. See A/B Testing, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A/B-testing (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
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present in that setting; often, it may rather be the "self' that your proactive
environment thinks you want to be at that time and place. Thus, machine learning
will compound the challenges of online and onlife privacy, as it risks lulling
people into an imposed sense of self to the detriment of a self-determined sense
of self.226
More arguments and developments could be mentioned that showcase
the challenges of digital privacy, but space is running out here. I hope that this
brief discussion suffices to demonstrate the usefulness of looking at digital
privacy challenges through the lens of traditional privacy spaces and the
associated norms and practices. Traditional privacy spaces form a theme on
which digital spaces offer boundless variations. The as yet enigmatic variations
in digital privacy spaces can be better appreciated when we keep in mind the
initial theme that they vary on: the traditional spaces in which you can be
yourselves.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have introduced the concept of "privacy spaces" as spaces
in which people can be themselves, that is, where they are able to play the roles
and perform the impression management in social settings that they want to play
at a particular place and time. I have mapped a wide range of traditional types of
privacy spaces,22 7 from which four conclusions can be drawn. First, the overview
demonstrates that being able to be yourselves at certain times and places is
relevant in all zones of social life, not only in the personal and intimate zones,
but also in the semi-private and public zones of social interaction.2 2 8 Having a
privacy space is relevant both when being alone and when interacting with
others; it is relevant both in intimate relationships and in interactions with
acquaintances, colleagues, professionals, and strangers; and it is relevant both
for sharing or showing a very private part of yourself and for showing or sharing
trivia. This underlines the character of privacy as an infrastructural condition:
what matters is having the capability of being yourself at certain times and
places, not whether or how you use it.
A second conclusion is that not only do privacy spaces have great
variety; also, the boundaries of privacy are quite diverse in character. Boundaries
of privacy spaces can be visible or invisible, more or less fluid, more or less
penetrable, and have different penetrability in relation to different senses.
226
Cf Roger Clarke, The DigitalPersona and its Application to Data Surveillance, 10 INFo.
Soc'Y 77 (1994) (distinguishing between a projected personae (the digital persona over which
someone has some level of control, as she discloses the data that create it) and an imposed persona
(the digital persona that are created by others on the basis of data available about the person)).
227
Supra Part II.
228
Cf VINCENT, supranote 27, at 12 (observing that "from the medieval period onwards, those
seeking to protect their thoughts and intimacies viewed their physical environment as a continuum
of more or less transient opportunities").
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Obviously, moats and meter-thick walls constitute strong boundaries to fence off
one's castle; yet invisible, fluid, and permeable boundaries can also be quite
effective to preserve privacy in practice. People will seldom invade your personal
space marked by a bag in the seat next to you, and when a train gets so crowded
that your personal space shrinks to your own seat, most people will indicate with
a question or glance whether you are okay with their sitting next to you, and they
will generally respect the armrest in between as new boundary-marker between
your and their personal space.
Third, this also shows that privacy relies on two complementary
mechanisms: access restriction (creating boundary-markers that fence off a
privacy space) and discretion (the respect that others show for another's privacy
space). These are communicating vessels: the clearer the boundary-marker and
the more practically impenetrable the boundary, the less one has to rely on
others' discretion not to invade your privacy space. And vice versa: for spaces
delimited by invisible, fluid, or easily permeable boundaries, privacy relies
largely on others' discretion. This duality of mechanisms somewhat resonates
the oft-made distinction in privacy literature between access and control 229 but
has a different emphasis. While on one end of the spectrum, the mechanism of
access restriction is the same, the mechanism at the other end of the spectrum is
an effort by others to respect your privacy (discretion) rather than an effort by
you to control how others deal with what they get to hear or observe (control).2 30
After all, in situations involving invisible, fluid, or easily permeable boundaries,
but also in situations involving voluntary disclosure within a privacy space, you
only have limited control over others' behavior and subsequent information
processing.231 I therefore suggest that the prevalent distinction between access
and control should be discarded in favor of the distinction between access and

229
NISSENBAUM, supra note 19, at 70-71 formulates this distinction as a difference in
approaches to privacy as consisting in, on the one hand, a constraint on access (i.e., preventing
access by others to information, persons, or places) and, on the other, a form of control (in
particular, having control over information flows).
230
Cf SIMMEL, supranote 52, at 320-21 (observing that "discretion consists by no means only
in the respect for the secret of the other, for his specific will to conceal this or that from us, but in
staying away from the knowledge of all that the other does not expressly reveal to us. It does not
refer to anything particular which we are not permitted to know, but to a quite general reserve in
regard to the total personality").
231
Cf NISSENBAUM, supra note 19, at 70 (finding that while "most of what is written about
privacy assumes it to be a form of control, accounts in terms of access have tended to be more
precise and conceptually better developed"). The finding that privacy protection often relies on
others' discretion helps explain the limitations inherent to conceptualizing privacy in terms of
control. See Extended Self supra note 5, at 486 (observing that "processes of self management are
not fully under our control. Even if we restrict certain content to a designated circle of online
friends, there is no guarantee that the information will not be reposted, retweeted, or quoted.....
While we may exercise self-control, it is far harder to control all our digital self representations
when others may reshare with unintended audiences").
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discretion, as this distinction captures more accurately how privacy protection
works.
And this relates to a fourth conclusion: the protection of privacy is highly
dependent on social norms. Many of the privacy spaces I have discussed involve
behavioral norms developed over time to respect people's privacy. The fact that,
usually, mental bubbles are not snapped, diaries not read, bodies not touched,
doors of rooms of one's own not opened without knocking, private conversations
not published when accidentally overheard, private parts in communal showers
not stared at; the fact that the bench in the park is kept for you while you buy an
ice-cream, and that colleagues do not tell your spouse what you told them at the
coffee table-all this speaks to the fact that many privacy spaces are respected
because of relatively strongly rooted social patterns. (Of course, these privacy
spaces are also frequently invaded, to people's annoyance or harm-social
norms are standards of behavior, not laws of nature.) Where privacy intrusions
(can) have serious effects, the social norms tend to be backed up and reinforced,
and sometimes steered or adapted, by legal norms; indeed, several privacy
spaces, such as the body, home, and letters can claim strong legal protection. But
if we oversee the landscape of privacy spaces, privacy protection turns out to be
first and foremost a process of socialregulation rather than legal regulation. And
for many privacy spaces, the associated social norms of behavior have developed
over relatively long periods of time, and are more or less strongly embedded in
local social practices. Social norms evolve along with changes in the sociotechnical environment of social interactions because they depend not only on
people but also on the affordances of spatial settings and, particularly, on the coproduction of humans and their environment. But if such changes are fast and
disruptive, social norms have a hard time catching up. This is one, and perhaps
the most underestimated, aspect of the problem of digital privacy spaces.
As I have argued, the challenges of digital and online privacy can be
better understood when the historical roots of social interaction patterns are taken
into account, and when the digital, or rather onlife, spaces in which social
interactions take place, are analyzed as combinations, adaptations, and
extensions of traditional spaces.2 32 Digital spaces collapse traditional privacy
spaces, and, while at first sight sometimes appearing as an extension of a certain
traditional space (such as the private communications space of
telecommunications), they are actually (also or rather) extensions of other spaces
(such as personal writings, personal possessions, the home, and various
professional privacy spaces). Because digital spaces are far more interconnected
and interoperable than traditional spaces (which will be compounded by
technological developments such as robotics, the Internet of Things, and machine
learning), fewer boundaries avail to clearly delimit digital privacy spaces.
Impression management is more complicated, both because of unfamiliarity with
the types of expressions one gives off online (metadata and inferred data), and
232

Supra Part III.
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because digital spaces often trigger different partial identities at the same time,
or at different times on the same platform, more so than in traditional spaces.
Moreover, not only are social norms slow to evolve, information flows are often
different, and often involve, besides communications partners and by-standers, a
service provider looking over your shoulder. The co-habitation of service
providers in digital spaces stands in stark contrast to traditional physical spaces,
where the "space provider" does not usually, and certainly not systematically,
monitor what people do in their space. As a result of all these factors, digital, or
onlife, impression management therefore virtually requires people to be aware
of all their selves all of the time, which surely severely hampers their feeling they
can safely be "themselves" in any given situation, and which leads to a demise
of backstage spaces where people can relax and forget about role-playing for a
while. This disappearance of backstage spaces will have devastating effects,
because, as Westin observes, "[t]here have to be moments 'off-stage' when the
individual can be 'himself ....
organism." 2 33

To be always 'on' would destroy the human

The analysis in this paper opens up a broad spectrum for future research.
On one side of the spectrum, the map of traditional privacy spaces can be tested,
refined, expanded, or adapted, through analysis of, for instance, other bodies of
literature, non-Western societies, or concrete practices in particular types of
spaces. Also, normative work is required to match the conceptual map of privacy
spaces with the reality of privacy affordances in these spaces, both in terms of
how and to what extent privacy rights apply to particular spaces, and in terms of
how and to what extent particular privacy spaces work for vulnerable or minority
groups, and to what extent privacy is available to people for whom important
privacy spaces are illusory. On the other side of the spectrum, the challenges of
digital, online, and onlife privacy can be studied through the conceptual lens of
privacy spaces. The vast research on digital privacy and data protection can be
enriched by looking closely into how social interactions take place in particular
digital and onlife environments, bearing in mind the historical and spatial roots
of these interactions in traditional privacy spaces. Analyzing how traditional
spaces where social interactions take place are scrambled and rehashed into
digital and onlife spaces; whether and to what extent the social norms associated
with the former also co-evolve along with the latter; and how the interconnection
of digital spaces and the presence of digital "space providers" affect people's
capability of impression management and room for backstage relaxation-all
this can enhance our understanding of digital privacy challenges, in general and
in particular cases. And better understanding of these challenges, grounded in
awareness of spatio-temporal developments, is vital for informing effective
responses to these challenges, in law, policy, and design.

233

WESTIN, supranote 4, at 35.
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